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This thesis explores the relationship between the concept of 
gerrymandering and the destruction of social trust. The first chapter discusses the 
history of gerrymandering in the United States. The second chapter examines the 
foundations of the current status of the issue by focusing on the foundation of the 
Political Question Doctrine and its offspring, the Judicially Manageable Standard, 
as described in Baker v. Carr. The final chapter explores the link between the 
concept of corruption and gerrymandering. The thesis concludes with discussion 
of the effects of corruption on social trust. 
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Gerrymanders have been part of our political system from the beginning of 
the nation. They were not consistently effective and were not permanent, but they 
were and are a form of corruption. Corruption, in this sense, is not bribery or 
nepotism, but rather a violation of the ideas of fundamental fairness. This is a 
form of institutional corruption, a fundamental corruption that undermines 
essential functions of governance. For example, one is not likely to accept an 
opponent cheating by stacking the deck in their favor in a game of cards. 
Cheating in a contest is a form of corruption. 
Similarly, allowing political parties to stack the deck, via gerrymanders, in 
elections is cheating, it is corrupt. This thesis explores the connections between 
corruption and gerrymandering and how they effectively undermine our 
democratic institutions. In this way, it identifies gerrymandering as a threat to 
our nation and concludes that it must be treated as the danger it is to the very 
foundation of our democracy. 
Partisan gerrymanders are an attempt to stack the deck by the parties 
about which George Washington so rightly warned us. This form of corruption 
mostly persists due to the Supreme Court’s reluctance to act.  
While Chapter one focuses on the history of gerrymandering, the second 
chapter discusses this reluctance on the part of the court in depth. The idea that 
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gerrymanders are harmless has long been articulated both in academia and the 
popular press.1 In chapter three though, this analysis finds that they contribute to 
a vicious spiral that steadily undermines social trust while fueling increasing 
corruption.2 It is hard to overstate the importance of recognizing this form of 
corruption, wherever it arises. This thesis confines itself to normative 
connections between gerrymandering and corruption and later to a discussion of 
governmental corruption’s impact on the polity.  
An empirical connection might be more satisfying to some; however, due 
to the nature of corruption data tracking, it is quite challenging to come by. Many 
researchers use the prosecution and or the conviction rate for corruption. These 
data have a fragile relationship in comparison to other factors in recent research. 
Others point to the various survey indexes, and while these are interesting, they 
do not satisfy the needed connection between corruption rates and 
gerrymanders. Thus, this paper seeks to add to the body of work exploring 
gerrymandering, corruption, and their relationship. Additionally, it aims to 
illustrate that gerrymandering undermines our democratic institutions by 
 
1 Jowei Chen and David Cottrell, "Evaluating Partisan Gains from Congressional Gerrymandering: 
Using Computer Simulations to Estimate the Effect of Gerrymandering in the U.S. House," 
Electoral Studies 44 (2016), 329. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2016.06.014. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=119847991&site=ehost-
live&scope=site.; DAN McLAUGHLIN, "The Gerrymander Myth," National Review 69, no. 3 
(2017), 16.  
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=f5h&AN=121342245&site=ehost-
live&scope=site. 
2 Rose-Ackerman, Susan., Palifka,Bonnie J., Corruption and Government: Causes, 
Consequences, and Reform, Second ed. (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
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creating distrust in the voters. With an initial overview of this thesis complete, a 
more detailed examination is in order. 
The first two chapters were developed using the American Political 
Development view by focusing on periods bounded by significant change. 
American Political Development is a way of looking at political science in the 
United States by using historical data, and rather than focusing on a strict 
chronological view; it focuses on durable changes in policy.  
The first chapter covers three eras, The Era of Silence, The Equal Rights 
Era, The Era of the Manageable Standard. The purpose of this chapter is to 
establish gerrymandering as a firm fixture of American politics from the very 
beginning. This purpose is vital to address the idea that gerrymandering is ‘just a 
symptom’ of political division.  
This thesis finds the exact opposite; gerrymandering is at the root of 
American political dysfunction. The Era of Silence starts before the founding of 
the nation as early politicians found themselves freed of old feudal boundaries 
sought to control access to the reins of power. There are accusations of attempts 
at gerrymandering before the Boston Globe published its namesake map. Those 
accusations have not stood up to more recent scrutiny. In this era, the thesis 
looks at two cases, one because of its importance later and one as an example of 
the Supreme Court avoiding action on the subject of partisan gerrymandering. 
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The first case is significant as it brings two important ideas into American 
legal consideration.3 The first is ‘Judicial Review,’ and that second is a limit on 
judicial review, the Political Question Doctrine. The second chapter explores 
these concepts in depth. This era also discusses the open levels of, if observers 
choose to engage in ‘presentism,’ political corruption. These behaviors served to 
reinforce Americans' suspicion of government.  
The courts may have been shy about venturing into areas of Congressional 
power, but they were not shy about attempting to reign in corruption. The earliest 
Supreme court case found was from 1798. The thesis returns to the discussion of 
districting and covers the apportionment acts of 1842, 1911, and 1929. These acts 
are the foundation of the current House of Representatives. This discussion 
brings the second case of this era, Colegrove v. Green, into consideration. This 
case is an example of the Supreme Court’s view of partisan gerrymandering and 
the Court’s lack of role in regulating it.4  
The Equal Rights Era gets its name from the motivating factor for a 
change in Supreme Court views on gerrymandering. The focus here is not to 
establish an arbitrary date, but rather to explore the changes in court opinions 
from this time. This change in the Court’s view was forced by continued 
 
3 “Marbury v. Madison.” Justia. Accessed July 28, 2019. 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/5/137/#tab-opinion-1958607 




corruption in the South after World War Two. African Americans refused to 
tolerate Jim Crow laws, and maltreatment. Their contributions in World War 
Two served to change opinions across the nation. More importantly, it changed 
African Americans' views of themselves. The Civil Rights movement forced the 
national government to take a stand against the perversions of the Constitution 
practiced in the Jim Crow South. This era considers five cases, continuing the use 
of SCOTUS litigation as the defining vehicle.  
All five contribute to the change in the treatment of gerrymandering in a 
general sense.5 The first established the use of the 15th Amendment’s Equal 
Protection clause in gerrymandering cases. The second established the six criteria 
needed for the Court to withhold judgment in a case and brought the need for 
equality of district population firmly into the gerrymandering arena. The six 
criteria are listed below.6 For the gerrymandering issue, the second is of primary 
concern.  
1. A textual constitutional commitment of the matter to 
another branch of government, such as the power of the 
President in foreign affairs (note that later cases did not 
strictly adhere to this view); 
2. A lack of judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards for resolving the issue; 
 
5 Gomillion v. Lightfoot – 1958, Baker v. Carr – 1962, Gray v. Sanders – 1963, Wesberry v. 
Sanders – 1963, & Reynolds v. Simms – 1964 




3. A need for an initial policy determination before 
addressing the matter that courts would not be able to 
reach; 
4. A situation in which independent court action would 
violate the separation of powers framework; 
5. An unusual need to strictly adhere to a previous political 
decision; or 
6. A possibility that clashing statements on an issue by 
multiple branches of government would cause 
embarrassment 
 
The third defined the ‘one person, one vote’ doctrine. The fourth uses the 
criteria from an earlier case and defines gerrymandering as a justiciable issue. 
With this background, the final case pulls the rest of the electoral system into the 
realm of judicial review. Though there were cases after it, they did not add to the 
foundation established across the five cases from 1958 – 1964. 
The Era of the ‘Manageable Standard’ starts with the SCOTUS taking up 
the consideration of partisan gerrymandering in 1986. The ‘Manageable 
Standard’ question is not the only question in the apportionment arena in this 
time frame, but the rest are not germane to the subject of this thesis. In this era, 
the Court refuses to engage on the subject of partisan gerrymandering. The 




To examine the court’s responsibility in addressing partisan 
gerrymandering, the paper again considers five cases.7 The last two were 
combined by the SCOTUS and are discussed jointly. The cases paint an evolution 
in the Court’s view of its role concerning partisan gerrymandering.  
In the previous era, the Court was clear that it had a role in adjudicating 
these issues. At the start of this era, there is the beginning of a tidal change. The 
Court reaffirms the justiciability of gerrymandering, stumbling on the second of 
the six criteria listed above, the requirement for a discoverable and manageable 
standard by which to evaluate a partisan gerrymander. The Court chooses to 
exclude other questions that might have led them to a different conclusion. The 
Court mentions that this will invite further questions and challenges but does 
nothing to change that expectation. There were discussions of proportional 
representation and vote dilution, but in the end, they found no way to attack 
partisan gerrymanders.  
In the next case, the SCOTUS again fails to discover a manageable 
standard, and this time comes to a split decision on if it will forever be a 
controversy beyond the courts' reach. Four justices claim this, and four reject 
their claim. Justice Kennedy chose a middle path and, in a concurring opinion, 
 




left the door open to one day finding a standard. There are two other cases of 
some interest, and one is especially important for our consideration.  
A decision from 2006 is crucial as it allows states to redistrict as often as 
they wish. Combine this with computer-drawn apportionment maps and stacking 
the deck becomes an almost casual exercise.8 Additionally, in 2015 the Court 
ruled that states could use redistricting commissions and that voters could take 
the redistricting process away from state legislatures and give it to such 
commissions.9 At the close of the era, three cases came before the Court, and the 
majority found no standard. These will be discussed more fully in the second 
chapter.  
Chapter 2 delves into the manageable standard that the majority of the 
SCOTUS justices seem unable to find. This standard is rooted in the political 
question doctrine from the Marbury v. Madison decision authored by Justice 
Marshall. The idea that the judicial branch should not tread on the prerogatives 
of the political branches (those who are elected) stems from judicial review.  
Judicial review has a long history stretching back to the Justinian Code in 
Rome circa 530 B.C. It has changed, and the support for it in a democracy must 
be different than it would be under a monarchy. The sovereign in the United 
 
8 "League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry." Oyez. Accessed July 2, 2019. 
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2005/05-204 
9 "Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission." Oyez. Accessed 
July 2, 2019. https://www.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-1314. 
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States is the People, not a King or Queen. The type of sovereign does present 
problems though; the elected branches are the selected agents of the sovereign 
will, and the Court is unelected. Does an unelected group have the authority to 
impede the actions of the sovereign’s agents?  
In Federalist numbers 51, 78, & 80, there is a discussion of the branches 
and their relationships that is relevant here. The branches serve to check each 
other while maintaining their independence. This independence is further 
discussed in Federalist 80, reinforcing the need for an independent judiciary. The 
purpose of these checks and this independence is to keep the Constitution 
supreme, not any particular branch or office. To ensure the supremacy of the 
Constitution, the power of Judicial Review is necessary. It allows the Court to 
intercede when the other branches have exceeded their Constitutional bounds. 
The political question doctrine stems from judicial review via the ‘Doubtful 
Question Doctrine’ that was well established in Colonial judicial practice. The 
doubtful question doctrine was the idea that the judiciary should only declare 
actions of the political branches void if there were no reasonable doubt of its 
unconstitutionality. In modern jurisprudence, we have the Doctrine of Clear 
Mistake. This concept is related to the Doubtful Question Doctrine but focuses on 
the attitude of the Court as it enters its consideration of a case. This doctrine 
states that the Court should assume the action of the legislature is Constitutional 
from the beginning of their deliberations. All of these, and other, ‘doctrines’ are 
10 
 
guideposts for the justices and like precedent can be ignored if the justice believes 
they are in error or should not apply in a particular case. 
The second chapter also conducts a short literature review highlighting the 
continuing controversy over judicial review in the United States. In essence, the 
arguments, as they relate to gerrymanders, have not changed since the early days 
of the Republic. Alexander Hamilton argued that the courts are a vital check on 
the other branches, the state governments, the Legislative, and the Executive. 
Patrick Henry though, argued that the other branches would be irrelevant with 
such a powerful court.  
Expanding on the reader's understanding of the current controversy, the 
chapter turns to several of the significant cases where the political question 
doctrine was either employed or actively rejected. Each of these cases explores a 
different aspect of the political question doctrine and its application.10  
In the first case, there is concern for the requirement for a Republican 
Form of Government. The political question doctrine is employed here and, 
according to some, set the stage for Dred Scott v. Sandford. One of the worst 
decisions in the history of the Court. Next, the thesis considers a case from 1946. 
This case has two areas for consideration, ‘one man, one vote’ & jurisdiction over 
state governments' powers.  
 
10 Luther v. Borden – 1849, Colegrove v. Green – 1946, & Baker v. Carr – 1962 
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The thesis moves to a 1962 decision concerning reapportionment. There is 
a similarity with an earlier case in that the state failed to reapportion districts 
based on population changes. The six criteria defined in it give future courts some 
guidance in the application of the doctrine. With an examination of the political 
question doctrine in different arenas complete, the thesis moves to a discussion 
of the current controversy surrounding partisan gerrymanders.  
In the most recent cases, the majority has held that there was no 
discoverable manageable standard available to the Court.11 They did, however, 
bemoan the perversion of the Constitution that partisan gerrymanders represent. 
The minority discerned that the Court could use the ‘intent’ of the redistricting 
parties as a standard, especially given the evidence in these cases. Discussion of 
this occurs as the thesis turns to chapter three. 
The first concern of chapter three is corruption. Americans have an 
intense fear of corruption in government. The Constitution gives voice to this fear 
in its first Article. Corruption has, by no means disappeared. An examination of 
the history of the nation, using corruption as a lens, would present an interesting 
viewpoint. Currently, there is plenty of corruption to observe both ‘legal’ and 
illegal. The thesis here introduces a concept that might well be the source of 
another research effort. the idea of free and equal elections. The first Constitution 
of Pennsylvania, written in 1776, documents the desire for free and equal 
 
11 Rucho v. Common Cause & League of Women Voters of Michigan v. Benson 
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elections. Though this document was not long-lived, it showed the desire of 
average citizens to take control of their governments. When considering the 
demise of this Constitution and the development of the 1789 United States 
Constitution, a more balanced picture of the U.S. Constitution’s framers comes 
into focus. It is fashionable today to hold these gentlemen up as if they are saints 
when in reality, they are just as flawed as any citizen of today. After bringing the 
reality of our forefathers into focus, the thesis turns to a discussion of corruption.  
Next, there is a consideration of two indexes: Transparency International’s 
(T.I.) Corruption Perception Index (CPI) & the Economist Intelligence Unit’s 
Democracy Index (EIU DI). Both of these indexes examine perceptions of 
countries and rank them according to various factors. In both indexes, the United 
States is on the decline, that is, the perception is that the United States is more 
corrupt and less democratic than at any time since the start of these indexes. 
Though these are mere ‘perceptions,’ perceptions are important. Especially in the 
arenas of public confidence and, as is discussed later, social trust. Public 
confidence in the United States has also been declining. The sources indicate 
several reasons behind this going back to Watergate. With an understanding of 
the American fear of corruption and declining confidence in government of its 
citizens, the paper turns to the ‘acid’ that is gerrymandering and how it eats at the 
foundations of democratic institutions.  
This thesis explores gerrymandering, corruption, and their impact on 
democratic institutions. The consideration now is how does corruption, 
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gerrymandering, affect democratic institutions? There is a solid base of research 
that explores these effects and the vicious spiral that results as citizens lose 
confidence in their government. Social Trust and political trust are concepts that 
explore the volume of trust citizens have generally, in their governments 
specifically, and how these factors affect communities. Putnam initiated the study 
of ‘Social Trust,’ and this study has continued today. This field of research has led 
to the understanding that generalized trust is based on perceived fairness and 
undermines other views that it is based centrally on some sort of homogeneity in 
a population. Additionally, chapter three provides an examination of Political 
Trust, related to Social Trust but more focused. The discussion in this area shares 
an operationalized or individualized definition of Political Trust. It also highlights 
some of the empirical research in the ‘Trust’ arena.  
In the end, we come to this; gerrymandering is ‘legal’ corruption. 
Corruption destroys social trust. Social trust is the bedrock of democratic 
governance. Ergo, gerrymandering is a threat to democratic institutions.  
With a firm idea of where this thesis leads, the journey begins on the 
following pages…  
 
Definitions 
For the purposes of this thesis, some standard definitions for terms need 




Districting is the process for drawing the geographical lines that will define 
legislative districts.  
Apportionment 
Apportionment refers to the distribution of legislative seats among 
established geographical units, i.e., counties, towns. For the United States House 
of Representatives, we generally use first past the post elections for single-
member districts, defined by their population size determined in the decennial 
census. 
Malapportionment 
If apportionment refers to the ‘correct’ distribution of seats; therefore, 
malapportionment refers to the distribution of seats in an abnormal manner. A 
manner not in keeping with the conventional method of distribution. 
Malapportionment may carry a negative context for some. However, it is not 
always used for ill intent. Sometimes, as in the case of racial apportionment, it is 
used to accomplish goals of more equal representation. It is sometimes used 
interchangeably with ‘gerrymandering.’ 
Gerrymandering 
To define gerrymandering simply is to say it is a synonym for redistricting 
or redefining congressional districts. The term ‘gerrymandering’ more specifically 
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implies a redistricting effort that is outside the norm or, in some way, creates a 
bias in the political process. This type of redistricting has two uses. The more 
acceptable one is when it is used to address past inequity in the electoral process. 
In the past, it has been used to create ‘majority-minority’ districts ensure the 
election of representatives from previously suppressed groups. African American 
communities have specifically been the targets of these past efforts. These 
gerrymanders are typically referred to as ‘racial gerrymandering.’ The less 
acceptable (to some) use, is to create a bias that helps a specific political party — 
referred to as ‘partisan gerrymandering,’ or more recently ‘extreme partisan 
gerrymandering.’ 
In accomplishing a gerrymander there are two basic techniques, packing 
and cracking:12  
Packing is used to combine a population that tends to vote in a certain 
way, or that has a shared demographic factor into a single district. This allows 
them representation, but it also removes their influence from surrounding 
districts. Packing is often used to turn these districts into ‘safer’ seats for the 
politicians. If done ‘correctly,’ packing can have the effect of both ensuring 
 
12 Friedman, John N. and Richard T. Holden. 2008. "Optimal Gerrymandering: Sometimes Pack, 
but Never Crack." American Economic Review 98 (1): 113-144. doi://www.aeaweb.org/aer/. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=eoh&AN=0954665&site=ehost-
live&scope=site http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.1.113 http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/. 
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representation for a group and limiting the political power of their representative 
when they start working.  
Cracking is the reverse of packing; populations are broken into separate 
districts, thus diluting their ability to elect a preferred representative. Using the 
cracking method can create districts that appear more competitive but are 
actually very safe seats. If the percentage by which a seat is won is narrowed, it 
can give this appearance without actually endangering the position from a 
partisan perspective. Other techniques that have been developed recently, 
especially through the use of computers, are still versions of the two methods 
above with additional techniques applied. 
Corruption 
What is ‘corruption’? In the political arena, corruption is the use of 
political power or access for partisan gain. The type of corruption that is the focus 
of this paper is cheating in elections. Gerrymandering is cheating in elections. It 
is institutional or legalized corruption. Corruption does not have to be illegal per 
se to harm the polity. It need only present the appearance of impropriety.13  There 
are many ‘legal’ practices that citizens will find distasteful; however, corruption 
(gerrymandering here) is a particular case in that it undermines the primary 
political institutions necessary in our republic.  
 
13 Hellman, Deborah. 2012. "Defining Corruption and Constitutionalizing Democracy." Michigan 
Law Review 111 (2012) (/03/13). https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2021188.  
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Chapter One: A History of Gerrymandering 
Introduction 
In late July 1787, the Constitutional Convention delegated the 
responsibility for drafting their determinations on the structure of the new 
government to the Committee of Detail.14  This committee’s work was integral in 
determining the shape of the country and its political structure. One of the many 
vital determinations of policy agency established was that given to the Congress 
to “…determine the voter qualifications, districts, and times of elections to the 
U.S. House of Representatives.”15 Giving the House the power to govern elections 
for its members was one of the most consequential decisions made. Its effects 
echo through the years and recently have occupied a significant amount of 
attention as the nation grapples with gerrymandering. This decision represents a 
particularly ‘sticky’ bit of policy agency. Before examining the history of 
gerrymandering, the thesis reviews the current ideas in the literature.  
A Review of the Literature 
The first concept in the review is corruption. The paper looks at this 
because of the centrality of corruption and its impact on this thesis. After 
corruption, the review considers three recurring general issues found in both the 
litigation and the literature that impact both the judicial and legislative 
 





involvement in districting.16 The first is Federalism, or ensuring the national 
government is not intruding on state prerogatives. Second, Separation of Powers, 
how should the courts be involved, or not? And, finally, partisan gerrymandering: 
‘is it constitutional?’, ‘is it legal?’, and ‘is it fair?’. In closing, the review looks at 
literature on gerrymandering. The literature is grouped into three areas of 
consideration: ‘gerrymandering is a threat?’, ‘it is not a threat?’, & work that 
seeks to measure gerrymandering, asking ‘if it has an effect at all?’, or ‘what is its 
effect?’. 
Corruption 
Corruption is a dangerous phenomenon. Gerrymandering is a form of 
corruption, and thus a review of it is pertinent. In looking at corruption in 
American government, the research finds that there is a cornucopia of literature. 
Most of it uses a variation the three definitions provided by Welch & Perry: A) “A 
political act becomes "corrupt" if it violates some system of civic or public order.”, 
B) “…commission of an illegal act, an act that violates the formal standards of a 
public role for private gain.”, C) “a political act is corrupt when the weight of 
public opinion determines it so…”.17 Corruption has been part of politics for as 
 
16 Clarke, Bruce, Robert Timothy Reagan, and Federal Judicial Center. 2002. Redistricting 
Litigation. Washington, D.C.: Federal Judicial Center. Pp. 6 
17 Welch, Susan and John G. Peters. 1977. "Attitudes of Us State Legislators Toward Political 





long as there have been. Fraud was noted in the California State census of 1852.18 
Summers presents a striking portrait of Gilded Age political corruption run 
amok.19 Our concept of corruption has changed, however. What was once 
acceptable, for example helping one's family, is now the subject of laws to prevent 
it. Nor is the question settled; the Citizens United v. FEC decision “…substantially 
cut back on the power Congress has to regulate in campaign finance…” a 
traditional suspect in the discussion of political corruption.20 Others go further 
still, asserting that the focus on illegal activities “…fails to account for much of 
what the public thinks is corrupt.”21 Which is where the focus of this thesis is on 
gerrymandering. An activity that, while legal, is perceived as corrupt. 
Corruption is not limited to the government; unions are rife with it; 
corporations are often caught acting in a corrupt manner.22 Even sitting 
 
18 Wood, Warren C. 2018. "Fraud and the California State Census of 1852: Power and 




19 Summers, Mark W. 2004. Party Games: Getting, Keeping, and using Power in Gilded Age 
Politics. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.  
20 Gerken, Heather K. 2015. "The Real Problem with Citizens United: Campaign Finance, Dark 
Money, and Shadow Parties." Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 159 (1): 5. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=i3h&AN=112957508&site=ehost-
live&scope=site.  
21 McCann, James A. and David P. Redlawsk. 2006. "As Voters Head to the Polls, Will they 
Perceive a “Culture of Corruption?”." PS: Political Science & Politics 39 (4) (Oct): 797-802. 
doi:10.1017/S1049096506060963.  
22 Thieblot, A. J. 2006. "Perspectives on Union Corruption: Lessons from the Databases." Journal 





legislators have written about corruptions’ prevalence within their workplaces.23 
Teachout asserts that the Framers were “obsessed” with corruption.24 Because of 
this obsession, the Framers made the ‘fight against corruption a central part of 
the United States Constitution.’25 Other scholars add to this argument asserting 
the fiduciary nature of governments, relying extensively on Locke for 
justification.26 Still, others broaden this view proclaiming a norm of impartiality 
and against partisanship, taking very expansive views on governmental duty and 
its impact on corruption.27 Some are wary of these extended arguments, though, 
reminding that constituent service is an essential and legitimate function of 
political office.28 Some counter the assertion of obsession, arguing that it goes too 
far and is just wrong in some instances.29 In defining the reach of an anti-
corruption principle (if it exists), these scholars posit that ‘its scope is modest: it 
 
23 "Crooks in the Legislature, by a State Senator." American Mercury 41 (1937), 269. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=rgr&AN=522381178&site=ehost-
live&scope=site. 
24 Teachout, Zephyr. 2009. "The Anti-Corruption Principle." Cornell Law Review 94 (341) 
(/03/04): 341-413. https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1353203. Pp. 348 & 352 
25 Ibid Pp. 347 
26 Bauries, Scott R. 1. 2012. "The Education Duty." Wake Forest Law Review 47 (4): 705-768. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=lft&AN=84577009&site=ehost-
live&scope=site.  
27 Kang, Michael S. 2017. "Gerrymandering and the Constitutional Norm Against Government 
Partisanship." Michigan Law Review 116 (3): 351. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=f5h&AN=126540649&site=ehost-
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does not reach the whole gamut of federal and state government positions; 
instead, it is limited to federal appointed offices.’30 Other critics of “The Anti-
Corruption Principle,” go further, construing the argument to say “…under the 
anti-corruption principle a private citizen may not petition the government for 
redress of grievances…”31 This argument is a bit hyperbolic but is in line with the 
idea that such an overriding concept requires thorough dissection. Interestingly 
critics of the “The Anti-Corruption Principle” fail to address the underlying 
supports for it. 
Corruption is a thorny issue for all; the SCOTUS has also struggled with 
it.32 It takes more than a mere exchange of money for a favor to qualify as 
‘corruption.’33 Corruption is also a concern outside the United States with “…the 
frustration shared by practitioners and scholars alike at the apparent lack of 
success in controlling corruption worldwide.”34 Often we see attempts to deal 
 
30 Ibid. 
31 Redish, Martin H. and Elana Nightingale Dawson. 2012. "Worse than the Disease: The Anti-
Corruption Principle, Free Expression, and the Democratic Process." William & Mary Bill of 
Rights Journal 20 (4): 1053. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=lft&AN=76315435&site=ehost-
live&scope=site.  
32 Capita, Katherine and Michael Crites. 2018. ""Tawdry Tales of Ferraris, Rolexes, and Ball 
Gowns:" How Mcdonnell V. U.S. Redefined "Official Acts" in Public Corruption Prosecution." 
Widener Law Journal 27 (1): 125-153. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=asn&AN=128076290&site=ehost-
live&scope=site.  
33 Ibid. Pp 150. 
34 Claudia Baez-Camargo and Alena Ledeneva. 2017. "Where does Informality Stop and 
Corruption Begin? Informal Governance and the Public/Private Crossover in Mexico, Russia and 




with perceived corruption in the passage of laws to criminalize lack of compliance 
with established norms.35  
Political scientists are working hard in the effort to measure corruption 
empirically and its impact. The work showing the difference between anti-
corruption law and implementation of said law is noteworthy as a measure of 
tolerance of corruption. Often work on an international scale mirrors the efforts 
to study corruption in the United States.36 A widely accepted measure is using the 
prosecution of corruption as an indicator of the level of corruption, generally. 
This measure was first asserted in 1992 and has been updated since then.37 The 
scholars use prosecution of public officials for corruption to measure government 
corruption at the state and, by extension, the national level.38 The use of 
prosecutions as a measure for corruption has found wide application. One scholar 
used it to examine the relationship between corruption and state-level 
environmental programs.39 Others combine it with wage data to consider the 
 
35 Dance, Scott. "Maryland Senate Passes Bill Requiring Presidential Candidates to Release Tax 
Returns." baltimoresun.com., last modified March 5, accessed Apr 22, 2018, 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/politics/bs-md-president-tax-returns-20180305-
story.html.  
36 Supra note 34. Pp. 51 
37 Meier, Kenneth J. and Thomas M. Holbrook. ""I seen My Opportunities and I Took 'Em:" 
Political Corruption in the American States." The Journal of Politics 54, no. 1 (1992): 135-155. 
doi:10.2307/2131647. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2131647.; Schlesinger, Thomas and Kenneth 
J. Meier. 2002. "Ch 33 - Variations in Corruption among the American States." In Political 
Corruption: Concepts and Contexts, edited by Michael Johnston and Arnold Heidenheimer, 627-
644. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers 
38 Ibid. 
39 Woods, Neal D. 2008. "The Policy Consequences of Political Corruption: Evidence from State 




impact of resources on the prosecution of corruption cases.40 Still, others use the 
prosecutions measure to investigate many different areas: alcohol taxation rates 
and traffic fatalities, campaign contributions in light of prosecutions, corruption’s 
impact on state spending and resource allocation, expansion of government debt, 
and its correlation to corruption.41 Mickael & Pickering use prosecutions and 
prosecutorial resources to find that polarization increases accountability.42 Their 
findings are interesting in light of the work Meir et al., showing a lack of targeting 
or strategic prosecutions.43 Escresa expands it to international usage and refines 
it to focus on bribery prosecutions as the current ways of measuring corruption 
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from the American States." Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 30 (2): 306. 
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Influence? Corruption and U.S. State Beer Taxes." Public Finance Review 37 (3): 339. 
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live&scope=site.; Gokcekus, Omer and Sertac Sonan. 2017. "Political Contributions and 
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Public Administration Review 74 (3): 346. 
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live&scope=site.; Liu, Cheol, Tima T. Moldogaziev, and John L. Mikesell. 2017. "Corruption and 
State and Local Government Debt Expansion." Public Administration Review 77 (5): 681. 
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live&scope=site. 
42 Melki, Mickael and Andrew Pickering. 2018. NICEP Working Paper: 2018-02 Polarization and 
Corruption in America. School of Politics, The University of Nottingham, Law & Social Sciences 
Building, University Park, Nottingham, NG7 2RD: Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for 
Economic and Political Research.  
43 Schlesinger, Thomas and Kenneth J. Meier. 2002. "Ch 33 - Variations in Corruption among the 
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have well-known weaknesses.44 Those weaknesses, reliance on surveys of those 
experiencing corruption and peoples’ perception of it, give cause to question their 
validity.45  Others go further and disaggregate those accused and those convicted 
of corruption.46  
As popular as using the prosecution numbers for measuring corruption 
has become, some have been unable to fully replicate the work using other data 
sets. For example, Maxwell & Winters tried to replicate the results using data 
from a later period and were not able to find the same results.47 They offered an 
alternative method, discussed in a note at the end of the paper.48  
Federalism 
Federalism is a tricky issue in addressing gerrymandering. “States’ rights 
proponents have called for a “new federalism” for at least the past 30 years in 
 
44 Escresa, Laarni and Lucio Picci. 2017. "A New Cross-National Measure of Corruption." World 
Bank Economic Review 31 (1) (Feb): 196-219. doi:10.1093/wber/lhv031. 
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/10.1093/wber/lhv031.  
45 Ibid Pp 196-197. 
46 Goel, Rajeev K. 2014. "PACking a Punch: Political Action Committees and Corruption." Applied 
Economics 46 (10-12): 1161. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=eoh&AN=1433584&site=ehost-
live&scope=site.  
47 Winters, Richard F. and Amanda E. Maxwell. 2004. "A Quarter-Century of (Data on) 
Corruption in the American States." Conference Papers -- Midwestern Political Science 
Association: 1. doi: mpsa_proceeding_24374.pdf. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=asn&AN=16055277&site=ehost-
live&scope=site.  
48 In an email conversation with Dr. Winters he did not recall the FOIA request they mention in 
note 20 on page 16, stating ‘I don’t even remember the FOIA request that you reference.  
Something about it, I guess, may have appeared in an early draft of the paper...” Additionally, he 
provided an updated paper with no reference to the FOIA request. This updated paper is available 
upon request. He concurred with my assessment as to the popularity of using prosecution data as 
a case of possibly, in his words, “an available hammer.” 
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their effort to reverse what they see as an unhealthy shift of policy-making 
authority from the states to the federal government.”49 The assertion of 
Congressional power in this area via Article 1, Section 4 of the Constitution, 
would create significant opposition from voters. Several scholars note that 
precedent from Chapman v. Meir establishes districting is the responsibility of 
the States, and the courts should only act when the States violate the 
Constitution.50 One scholar asserts that the SCOTUS (Supreme Court of the 
United States) has overstepped its bounds in specific areas … 
…the ninth and tenth amendments to the United States 
Constitution, wherein the enumeration in the Constitution, 
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others, retained by the people, and the powers 
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.51  
 
In so doing, they have damaged Federalism. There is some merit to this 
argument. However, one must also consider that Congress and States have failed 
to act in addressing gerrymandering. Thus, there could be a role for the Court 
acting to protect the polity. Federalism is connected to the concept of separation 
 
49 Shaw, Greg M. and Stephanie L. Reinhart. 2001. "The Polls-Trends Devolution and Confidence 
in Government." Public Opinion Quarterly 65 (3): 369-388. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=5517047&site=ehost-
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50 Clarke, Bruce, Robert Timothy Reagan, and Federal Judicial Center. 2002. Redistricting 
Litigation. Washington, D.C.: Federal Judicial Center. 
51 Caruso, Lawrence R. 1969. "The Rocky Road from Colegrove to Wesberry; Or, You can'T Get 
there from Here." Tennessee Law Review 36 (4) (1968-): 621-705. 
https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/tenn36&i=635. Pp. 705 
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of powers in that they federalism, as the United States practices it, requires that 
each branch of government respect the prerogatives of the others to maintain the 
balance between them.  
Separation of Powers 
The issue of Separation of Powers in gerrymandering is no less fraught 
than federalism. How much should the courts intervene? Should they even be 
allowed to intercede? The SCOTUS  has more consistently avoided ruling on 
gerrymandering issues than it has produced judgments. As one scholar asks in 
1962, “Do the constitutional grants of power to Congress over congressional 
elections support an inference that the judiciary is excluded from dealing with 
inequitable districting for the same elections?”52 The question of inference seems 
to have been settled in Baker and later SCOTUS cases in favor of the court having 
a role. There are still concerns in the SCOTUS over the judiciary’s involvement. 
Another later argues, “…legislative powers and the judicial power, respectively, 
are separately and distinctly defined, with no hint that the courts may act in an 
area exclusively reserved for Congress if the Court thinks Congress has acted 
unwisely or if it has chosen not to act.”53 Another area of contention noted is that 
 
52 Black, Charles L. 1963. "Inequities in Districting for Congress: Baker V. Carr and Colegrove V. 
Green Symposium: Baker V. Carr." Yale Law Journal 72 (1) (1962-): 13-22. 
https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/ylr72&i=45. Pp. 21 
53 Caruso, Lawrence R. 1969. "The Rocky Road from Colegrove to Wesberry; Or, You can'T Get 
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“…a broad legislative privilege protects the legislative process from harmful 
intrusions by the other branches of government.”54 Concluding…  
Federal Speech or Debate Clause precedent grasps 
the importance of the separation of powers and legislative 
efficiency to the legislative process by applying an absolute 
legislative privilege in nearly all cases.55  
 
There are several who would note that ‘districts that are commission and 
court-drawn experience more competition on average than those drawn by 
legislatures.’56 Is more competition desirable? Do districts drawn with 
partisanship as the first consideration create better representation? These are 
just some of the questions raised; they are beyond the scope of this inquiry. 
Threat and Measurement 
Referring to other categorizations of the literature, it is time to consider 
the authors in the threat-effect/no threat-effect categories. Among those that 
view gerrymandering as a threat, gerrymandering as an undermining influence 
on the American system, they often refer to times of strife and extreme 
polarization in their work. For example, there are those that argue that the 
SCOTUS must act to address it in these “cynical times.”57 They are not alone; 
 
54 Lamberson, J. P. 2017. "Drawing the Line on Legislative Privilege: Interpreting State Speech Or 
Debate Clauses in Redistricting Litigation." Washington University Law Review 95 (1): 203-225. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=lft&AN=124674180&site=ehost-
live&scope=site. Pp. 206 
55. Ibid Pp. 224 
56 Carson, Jamie L., Michael H. Crespin, and Ryan D. Williamson. 2014. "Reevaluating the Effects 
of Redistricting on Electoral Competition, 1972–2012." State Politics & Policy Quarterly 14 (2): 
165-177. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24711102. Pp. 165 
57 Ibid Pp. 351 
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others assert that the courts focus on adjudicating personal/individual rights 
cases serves to harm these areas by failing to rule in questions that focus on 
government structure and harm to the polity.58 Of note is evidence that one of the 
effects of racial gerrymandering could be less substantive representation.59 That 
is to say that the communities, the gerrymander was intended to help may suffer 
because of it. Racial gerrymandering is mentioned here because many have 
indicated it is hard to differentiate the two. After all, many groups, from 
immigrants to other minorities, have been shown to vote primarily for 
Democratic candidates. On the other side of the argument, we find those that say 
gerrymandering does not matter. Engstrom notes in the conclusion to his 
definitive work on gerrymandering in American history:  
But political science and history have 
underestimated the importance of gerrymandering in 
shaping the dynamics of American party history. Districting 
determined who held political power in the Congress and 
fundamentally altered the course of public policy.60   
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In concluding the review of scholarship on gerrymandering, we come to 
work that attempts to measure gerrymandering, its effect, and how to correct it. 
Scholarship in this area serves to encourage efforts to address gerrymandering; it 
is pernicious and difficult to engage. Compactness has been a consistent measure 
for evaluating gerrymanders.61 An additional option proposed is using a 
computer simulation to establish a baseline for assessing a gerrymanders' effect 
on the composition of the House.62 This baseline is useful, generally, but along 
with others, the focus is on measuring impacts at the national level where 
corruption is more difficult to discover.63 Scholars take different positions on the 
subject but still do not address the central concern of the subject of this thesis, 
the impact of the effects of gerrymandering on public trust. McGhee proposes an 
 
61  Fan, Chao, Wenwen Li, Levi J. Wolf, and Soe W. Myint. 2015. "A Spatiotemporal Compactness 
Pattern Analysis of Congressional Districts to Assess Partisan Gerrymandering: A Case Study with 
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63 Best, Robin E., Shawn J. Donahue, Jonathan Krasno, Daniel B. Magleby, and Michael D. 
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82-84. doi:10.1089/elj.2017.0471. https://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2017.0471.; Best, Robin E., Shawn 
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live&scope=site.; McGhee, Eric. 2018. "Rejoinder to “Considering the Prospects for Establishing a 
Packing Gerrymandering Standard”." Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy 17 (1): 73-
82. doi:10.1089/elj.2017.0461. https://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2017.0461. 
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alternative to symmetry and responsiveness.64 Others vigorously defend 
Symmetry as a better measure.65 ‘Symmetry’ is where parties receive the same 
number of seats as each other, given they also have equal vote share.66 
‘Responsiveness’ measures how many seats incumbents lose elections when 
measured against changes in the total vote.67 Later, McGhee and Stephanopoulos 
further develop the ‘Efficiency Gap’ method of measuring gerrymanders.68 This 
measure briefly found some success, being accepted by the SCOTUS in Whitford 
v. Gill.69 Ostrow presents us with several approaches addressing apportionment 
by changing the way we conduct elections.70 There are attempts to employ 
weighted voting, proportional representation, and others, and there is significant 
interest in them. However, they are not within the scope of this paper. 
 
64 McGhee, Eric. 2014. "Measuring Partisan Bias in Single-Member District Electoral Systems." 
Legislative Studies Quarterly 39 (1): 55-85. doi:10.1111/lsq.12033. https://doi-
org.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/10.1111/lsq.12033. Pp. 55 
65 Ibid.  
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Stephanopoulos, Nicholas O. and Eric M. McGhee. 2015. "Partisan Gerrymandering and the 
Efficiency Gap." The University of Chicago Law Review 82 (2): 831-900. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/43410706.  
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Finally, the recurring issue of partisan gerrymandering is at the heart of 
this paper. Debates range across the moral and legal spectrum. In Vieth v. 
Jubelirer, the SCOTUS declares that ‘excessive’ partisanship is not permissible, 
and must explain what that means so that others might develop a reasonable test 
to expose it.71 Some object to partisan gerrymandering but find that the reasons 
for addressing it must be grounded more firmly in Constitutional ideals rather 
than addressing competition concerns or reducing polarization.72 At the same 
time, partisan gerrymandering “…implicates First Amendment rights because 
‘political belief and association constitute the core of those activities protected by 
the First Amendment.”73 Proponents of this view note Justice Kennedy’s mention 
of it when concurring in Vieth v. Jubelirer.74 Kang is especially assertive on this 
point,  
First Amendment case law about government speech 
and patronage most clearly announces the principle against 
government partisanship, but the norm permeates 
constitutional law under many different rubrics, including 
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equal protection case law addressing other elements of 
redistricting and election administration.75  
 
He goes further in the application, citing Justice Stevens, of First Amendment 
protections as noted above, arguing for a principle against partisanship. This 
view is based on Locke’s view of government as a ‘fiduciary.’76 This view of 
fiduciary duty was noted and expanded dramatically by Zephyr Teachout in the 
paper “The Anti-Corruption Principle.”77 Others support this view in the issue of 
gerrymandering, saying, “…lack of any consensus as to when a normal or 
acceptable level of political motivation, assuming there is such a thing, shades 
into an extreme or objectionable level.” (emphasis added)78 Conversely, some 
argue that gerrymandering produces a ‘preferred’ legislature, from the viewpoint 
of voters.79 
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With an understanding of the concepts represented in the literature, the 
next step is to examine the three eras of judicial thought on gerrymandering. 
 
The Era of Silence80 
 
 
In 1812 Elbridge Gerry found himself criticized by the Boston Globe for his 
‘Gerrymandered’ set of congressional districts. Mr. Gerry had drawn districts in, 
particularly strange shapes to achieve partisan advantage in the legislature. This 
was not the first time such a strange creature had visited the new nation, but it 
was the first time the public took real notice.81 Mr. Gerry’s map was the first 
 
80 At the start of this portion of my thesis, I must acknowledge the work of Dr. Erik J. Engstrom 
more prominently. His book “Partisan Gerrymandering and the Construction of American 
Democracy” was central to my understanding of the role gerrymandering has played in American 
history. For a definitive treatment of the subject, I cannot recommend this book highly enough. 
Additionally, the analysis of apportionment litigation through 1964 by Pierson & Capp in  
‘Wesberry v. Sanders: Deep in the Thicket Notes’ is masterful and worthy of your attention. 
81 Hunter, Thomas Rogers. 2011. "The First Gerrymander?" Early American Studies, an 
Interdisciplinary Journal 9 (3): 781. 
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American Democracy. Legislative Politics & Policy Making. Ann Arbor: The University of 
Michigan Press; It is of note that in modern usage we have forgotten that a ‘salamander’ in the 
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partisan malapportionment that had generated significant editorial interest, and 
thus the name of the practice comes from Mr. Gerry.  
This Era runs from the founding of our nation until approximately 1960. 
The issue at hand for this era is the high degree of deference given to the Marshall 
precedents and the prevailing interpretations of them. This era also considers 
Colgrove v. Green to illustrate how the deference to Justice Marshall and the 
precedents set in Marbury endured. 
 82 
The Boston Globe article with its, now famous, illustration of the monster, 
is the first documented protest directed at a partisan redistricting scheme found. 
 
context of 1812 was a fire-breathing elemental animal or what we would refer to as a ‘dragon’. 
Thus, references to an amphibian creature that are used today are in error and do not 
communicate the intent in the original criticism of gerrymanders. 




However, it was not the first time politicians had availed themselves of this tool. 
There were accusations of similar efforts by other politicians, but none that 
attracted the same level of attention. Some wished to attribute the first to Patrick 
Henry, but though there might have been examples of partisan gerrymandering 
as far back as 1788, the studies were not conclusive.83  Corruption was much in 
evidence in redistricting; the gerrymander as just one tool used by politicians to 
ensure their continued partisan dominance.84 When looked at in the context of 
the times, this kind of activity blends in with the norms of the age. 
Contemporaries may have accepted gerrymandering, but that does not mean they 
approved of it, as illustrated by the criticisms of Patrick Henry and the article in 
the Boston Globe. The spoils or patronage system made for material motivations 
in maintaining partisan loyalty and dominance. Gerrymandering was an effective 
tool to accomplish this and was not uncommon. Likewise, redistricting was also 
quite common. Figure 2, below, from Dr. Engstrom’s Partisan Gerrymandering 
and the Construction of American Democracy, illustrates this point rather well. 
The pace of redistricting slows after 1900, down to the current era, where we 
usually see it happen after the decennial census.85 One should also note that the 
percentage of states redistricting after a census surges even as the pace slows. 
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The voters and newspapers of the time were often vocal in their 
displeasure about the corruption they saw but were unable to translate that into 
policy until the Pendleton Act of 1883. This act was passed to dismantle the 
patronage and spoils system in the civil service due to public pressure and disgust 
with the corruption they saw in their government.86 This legislation was the most 
significant action of the time to reign in corruption. Though the change was slow 
in arriving, the professionalization of the government had begun. Partisans took 
pains to avoid the courts’ involvement, even though the courts declined to act 
 
Engstrom indicate that the motivator was party competition. Thus, decreases in redistricting was 
party competition indicate lower levels of competitiveness at the state level.  
86 Theriault, S. M. "Patronage, the Pendleton Act, and the Power of the People." Journal of 





until the 1890s (they desired to dodge protracted fights), where the court might 
invalidate their carefully laid plans.87 Even when a case went before them, the 
courts were unlikely to take action except for in the most extreme 
circumstances.88 The courts based their inaction on the idea that redistricting is a 
‘political’ question.  
The ‘Political Question Doctrine’ was established by Chief Justice Marshall 
in Marbury v. Madison. Marshall wrote that “Questions, in their nature 
political or which are, by the Constitution and laws, submitted to the Executive, 
can never be made in this court.”89 (emphasis added). Apportionment seemed a 
natural extension to the power granted to Congress in Article 1 of the 
Constitution. Congress is a political body; therefore, many of the questions 
associated with it might fall under this heading. This idea, though, seems to have 
been in error, and we are still trying to resolve it today.  
The ‘hands-off’ stance of the courts may have contributed to the view of 
the government of the time as inept and corrupt. The spoils or patronage system 
was corruption writ large across the nation, and ineptitude was ignored in favor 
of political considerations.90 The courts’ refusal to act (expecting Congress to self-
 
87 Summers, Mark W. Party Games : Getting, Keeping, and using Power in Gilded Age Politics, 
352. Though in the example case, the redistricting was found to be Constitutional, this type of 
fight was one they did not relish e.g. New York Supreme Court  - “Kinney v. The City of Syracuse” 
Caselaw Access Project. Accessed July 27, 2019. https://cite.case.law/barb/30/349/  
88 Ibid, 352. 
89 “Marbury v. Madison.” Justia. Accessed July 28, 2019. 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/5/137/#tab-opinion-1958607 
90 Supra note 84. 
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regulate?) was at best naïve. Given the greed shown before the drafting of the 
Articles of Confederation, one must question if there were not more cynical 
purposes at work during the Constitutional Convention or even in the courts. One 
glaring example was the scam orchestrated by Alexander Hamilton to buy 
‘Continentals’ at below face value, trading on people’s fears.91 The view of 
ineptitude and corruption still reverberates through our nation today.92 If added 
to the inborn suspicion of government that is part of our national character and 
one has a recipe for a government that must always prove its competence and 
integrity. Further discussion of this idea will occur in later portions of this paper, 
but the topic is worth an essay of its own.  
As for corruption on its own, there is no hesitation on the part of the 
courts in addressing this issue. One of the earliest SCOTUS corruption cases was 
delivered in 1798. That case, though, is not focused on elections.93  
 
91 Scaramella, Mark. "The Founding Scam." . Accessed Aug 18, 
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92  These are just two of the plethora of reports opinion polls available discussing the declining 
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about Americans’ Declining Trust in Government and each Other, 
2019. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/22/key-findings-about-americans-
declining-trust-in-government-and-each-other/.McCarthy, Justin. "Snapshot: U.S. Congressional 
Job Approval at 18%." Gallup News 
Service (2018): http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bsu&AN=129473802&s
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From 1790 through 1920, there were fourteen decennial (every ten years) 
censuses.94  During that time, there were a host of apportionment acts and 
legislation passed that brought us to the 435 member House of Representatives 
that we have today. Incidentally, Congress only reapportioned seats in the House 
after thirteen of the censuses.95 After the fourteenth census, the members of the 
House, it seems, were concerned for their jobs and knew the reapportionment 
would change and delayed action until 1927.96  
Of the Apportionment Acts, there are three of note, the Acts of 1842, 1911, 
and 1929. The Apportionment Act of 1842 was notable in that it is the only time 
Congress has voted to reduce its membership.97 More importantly, it created the 
‘single-member district’ method of representation. While single-member districts 
have become the norm for the United States, there are other methods that we 
could employ. In recent years there have been several initiatives to consider 
alternatives. Proportional Representation and one of its engines, the Single 
Transferable Vote, are currently popular alternatives. Ranked Choice Voting and 
Approval Voting have also gained attention. Pursuing these methods will require 
local and state efforts, as Congress is unlikely to change the system that elected 
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them. The Apportionment Act of 1911 continued the requirements for districts to 
be geographically contiguous( this was the last Apportionment Act to require 
this), reintroduced the equal population requirement, and increased the 
membership of the house to 435.98 The 1929 Apportionment Act was significant; 
it was named the ‘Permanent Apportionment Act of 1929’. It permanently fixed 
the size of the House of Representatives at 435, with allowances for inter census 
periods when new states were recognized.99 
While federal courts were reluctant to act on redistricting cases, state 
courts were more likely to take these cases.100 In the SCOTUS, there was no 
notable action until Colgrove v. Green (1946). What of Wood v. Broom (1932)? 
Though this case was concerned with gerrymandering, it did not explore the full 
range of issues found in Colgrove. Wood reaffirmed the status of the districting 
in the state according to the Apportionment Act of 1911, but the Court did not 
accomplish the deep dive we see in the latter case.101 
Colgrove v. Green reinforces judicial silence on gerrymandering, “Prior to 
the 1960s, court challenges to redistricting plans were considered non-justiciable 
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political questions”.102 The 1960s is separated from the Era of Silence because of 
the dramatic change in the nation’s political structure.  
In 1946, the acceptance of corruption was waning; the bureaucracy had 
been professionalized; the average Americans’ opinion of the government was at 
one of the highest points in history.103 In Colgrove v. Green, the court ‘…felt 
bound by the earlier decision in Wood v. Broom…’, however, it chose to discuss 
the stance of the court concerning apportionment and districting more generally. 
The Court reaffirmed equal population of districts, but also disposed of the 
consideration of compactness as a test of district validity. The court goes quite 
far, indeed here describing the limits of judicial action: 
 To sustain this action would cut very deep into the very 
being of Congress. Courts ought not to enter this political 
thicket. The remedy for unfairness in districting is to secure 
State legislatures that will apportion properly, or to invoke 
the ample powers of Congress. The Constitution has many 
commands that are not enforceable by courts, because they 
clearly fall outside the conditions and purposes that 
circumscribe judicial action.104 
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This limiting view of the courts' power is quite influential throughout legislation 
and litigation. Bickel noted, though, that “Colegrove did not hold that the Court 
may never interfere with the election process, or that there are no judicially 
enforceable constitutional principles that apply to elections.”105 Contrary to the 
many who were excited to interpret the case as shutting down the courts’ 
interference. However, this view ignores interpretations of the fiduciary nature of 
government, as asserted by Locke and others. In reference to government, the 
idea of fiduciary responsibility is that elected members and the staff must act in 
the best interests of the people. They hold in trust the assets of the nation; their 
motivations must not be self-serving. Here again, we see an inheritance from 
English Common Law.106 If we accept their assertion of the fiduciary function of 
government, then would it not fall to the courts to check the wandering of the 
legislature from that purpose? The court also says that there are adequate 
remedies in the Constitution to address these issues.107 It feels that the voters 
should act to corral the wandering legislative herd.108 As mentioned previously, 
this ignores the danger to the polity scholars assert. We will see this issue’s echo 
before we are done. Bickel notes the grounds on which challenges to districting 
plans might be brought, stating that the Fifteenth Amendment is a powerful tool 
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that could be deployed here.109 Fourteen years of confusion resulted from the 
Colgrove decision.110 The SCOTUS refused to hear cases on apportionment, and 
the states wandered in the wilderness.111  
The Equal Rights Era 
After the long period of silence on apportionment issues, the courts were 
finally forced to engage as the nation began to deal with one of its greatest sins, 
racial injustice. As mentioned, the exact year or date of the start of this era is up 
for debate. Does it start with the beginning of the Equal Rights movement? The 
passage of the Voting Rights Act? Perhaps it begins with the first case brought to 
the District Courts? Or it might start when the first case reaches the SCOTUS? 
Regardless of the exact date, this era is centrally concerned with 
malapportionment associated with racial injustice.  
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Case Impact Year 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot Equal Protection under 
the 15th Amendment.  
1958 
Baker v. Carr Established six criteria 
needed for the court to 
withhold judgment in a 
case. It also established 
that districts must be of 
equal population. 
1962 
Gray v. Sanders The ‘one person, one 
vote’ doctrine 
1963 
Wesberry v. Sanders Establishes judicial 
review of districting 
1963 
Reynolds v. Simms Opens the rest of the 




When considering the apportionment questions in this era, we must keep 
in mind the changes occurring in the nation. Burnham gives us a useful 
periodization scheme referring to this era as “The New Deal System.”112 
According to Burnham, this system had its start in 1932.113 It meets its end with 
the Civil Rights movement. This party system was doomed from the start, as are 
all such systems.114  It called for change even as it was born. The deals made to 
help the country recover from the Great Depression exposed a long-simmering 
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change in how northern Democrats viewed the nation. They were uncomfortable 
allowing Southern elites to manage the programs meant to help all citizens, 
knowing that in the South, they would be perverted into only helping whites.115 
African Americans' attitudes had shifted, as well.  
African Americans served in both World Wars with high distinction.116 
Their improved self-image and confidence would no longer allow second class 
citizenship and arbitrary ‘justice.’117 Discovering the reasons for the change in the 
world view of the Democrats is challenging and worthy of exploration at a later 
time.118 Suffice it to say, that after two world wars and decades under Jim Crowe 
laws, the Democrats could no longer ignore what they were seeing. In contrast, 
the Republicans saw an opportunity to add to their elite/business base by 
appealing to the southern elites who were increasingly uncomfortable with the 
direction of the Democrats.119  
 In 1958 a group of citizens of Alabama filed suit in the United States 
District Court in Alabama (Gomillion v. Lightfoot). They alleged that the 
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Legislature of Alabama had passed a law that was “…in violation of the due 
process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and also in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States.”120 The respondents sought to have the 
complaint dismissed based on were ‘separation of powers’ and ‘federalism’ 
arguments. The District Court found for the State of Alabama mainly on the 
separation of powers argument with some reference to the federalism argument 
as well.121 Not surprisingly, the citizens were not satisfied with this judgment and, 
in 1960, argued before the SCOTUS on the same grounds. The SCOTUS held 
explicitly that the District Court erred in its decision based on the Fifteenth 
Amendment.122 Stating, “Even the broad power of a State to fix the boundaries of 
its municipalities is limited by the Fifteenth Amendment, which forbids a State to 
deprive any citizen of the right to vote because of his race.”123 The Court also 
noted that the use of the ‘political question’ to hide discriminatory racial 
motivations was not acceptable.124  
This case is an excellent example of how laws are perverted to corrupt 
results. The Court noted that the respondents had not addressed the racial 
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questions, relying instead on their interpretation of the broad power of the 
State.125 This tactic of hiding corrupt intent behind the legitimate use of state 
power is a standard tool used to deprive citizens of their rights. This kind of 
perversion of the law also undermines the assertions of scholars who assert a 
fiduciary role for government. How can a government act as a fiduciary when it is 
intent on depriving some of its citizens of their rights? Tracking this kind of 
corruption, finding case law detailing the decision of the overturn of decisions 
based on this argument would be a stimulating exercise but beyond the scope of 
this paper. Additionally, the practice of hiding corrupt intent behind legitimate 
actions in redistricting efforts, though closer to the focus of this thesis, would also 
be beyond it. In the end, we find that the SCOTUS has ruled that despite its 
reluctance to rule on other areas of the redistricting question, it has no hesitation 
when the issue involves racially motivated redistricting.126 In Gomillion v. 
Lightfoot, we have a firmly grounded precedent for the consideration of 
districting cases based on racial discrimination. 
In Tennessee, a year after the initial filing of the Gomillion case, we see 
another case, Baker v. Carr in 1962, brought under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
Equal Protection Clause. The plaintiffs asked that the state be required to 
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reapportion the state legislature under the census of 1950.127 The state had not 
been reapportioned since 1901, and thus changes in the population of the various 
districts had created massive disparities in representation.128 The respondents 
sought dismissal on a separation of powers argument that the court had no 
jurisdiction in the case.129  
Similar to Gomillion, the District Court in Baker dismissed the case. 
However, in Baker, the dismissal was based on a lack of justiciability, using the 
Colgrove opinion as support. Once again, the plaintiffs did not take ‘no’ for an 
answer and sought help in the SCOTUS. In this case, the SCOTUS also held that 
the District Court had erred.130 Differently, the court reversed the case and 
remanded it back to the District for resolution.131  “For the first time made it clear 
that federal courts had jurisdiction to consider constitutional challenges to state 
legislative redistricting plans.”132 As noted by Cole, the current view of the 
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political question doctrine was established in Baker v. Carr.133  In Baker, we see a 
six criteria test that must be satisfied for a court to withhold an opinion:134  
1. A textual constitutional commitment of the matter to 
another branch of government, such as the power of the 
President in foreign affairs (note that later cases did not 
strictly adhere to this view); 
2. 2) A lack of judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards for resolving the issue; 
3. 3) A need for an initial policy determination before 
addressing the matter that courts would not be able to 
reach; 
4. 4) A situation in which independent court action would 
violate the separation of powers framework; 
5. 5) An unusual need to strictly adhere to a previous 
political decision; or 
6. 6) A possibility that clashing statements on an issue by 
multiple branches of government would cause 
embarrassment 
 
The Baker test is a rigorous test. In gerrymandering cases after Baker that 
demur from passing judgment, the court seems exclusively focused on the second 
factor. The dissent also regularly points out that the missing this factor is not 
sufficient justification for withholding an opinion, but that does not seem to 
matter to the plurality of justices. The reasoning for this, though laid out in the 
 
133 Cole, Jared P. and Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. American Law 
Division. The Political Question Doctrine. S.l: S.N., 2014. In this report Cole also explains the 
broader applications of this doctrine beyond electoral considerations. 




various cases as deferring to precedent and the intent of the Framers, lack 
comprehensiveness. They fail to discuss Locke and the fiduciary nature of 
government. The problem of a ‘…judicially discoverable and manageable 
standard’ is a difficult one but as will be discussed in Rucho even when one is 
present the Court demurs. Additionally, this case considers the question of 
population of districts, the vote dilution the plaintiffs faced was judged 
unconstitutional.135 Generally speaking, before, districts were rarely of equal 
population with their boundaries following normal lines of political division such 
as towns & counties.136 This case dragged on at the District level until 1965 when 
it finally concluded with more equitable representation.137  
The ‘One person, One Vote’ has been a view of political equality whose 
history stretches to 1891 and quite possibly further.138 In 1963 the SCOTUS 
reaffirmed this concept as a central idea in our system of government with an 8-1 
vote in the Gray v. Sanders opinion.139 The State of Georgia used a novel ‘county 
unit’ system to allocate votes in both the primary election for United States 
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Senator and statewide offices (such as the Governor).140 Assigning less and fewer 
units as the population of the county increased. Thus, residents of counties with 
large populations found their votes diluted. This dilution had the practical effect 
of keeping the power in the state in the rural areas. The court’s view was best 
summarized in the last phrase of the opinion “The conception of political equality 
from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the 
Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing -- 
one person, one vote.”141 
Our next visit to the SCOTUS brings us to one of the most referenced cases 
on apportionment litigation, Wesberry v. Sanders (1963). This case also finds us 
in Georgia as the traditional power structure finds itself under attack by the Civil 
Rights movement and attempts to maintain its control over the state. The District 
Court had (as others before it) referenced Justice Frankfurter’s minority opinion 
in Colgrove to dismiss the case as not justiciable as apportionment was a political 
question.142  
The Warren court, however, was not so inclined. The opinion in Wesberry 
was critical of the dismissal of the case by the lower court, finding its majority 








of apportionment due to unequal populations. The difference here is that the 
offices in question are in the United States House of Representatives. The 
plaintiff argued that their district population was approximately forty percent 
larger than the next largest district.143 Thus their level of representation and votes 
were diluted.  
The Constitutional matters at hand were under Article one, Section two, 
and the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and Section two of the 
same, where it discusses apportionment.144 The basic issue at hand is well 
summarized by Weiss, “The notion of effective participation in Wesberry deals 
only with quantitative dilution of the vote rather than distortion of voting power 
by gerrymandering or ethnic districting.”145 While the issue at hand was not 
gerrymandering, the case is pertinent in that it does deal with apportionment and 
separating apportionment cases from those whose narrow focus is 
gerrymandering runs the risk that we will miss important details as our 
discussion continues.  
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After the conclusion of Wesberry, the House Judiciary Committee began 
the legislative work to address the question of apportionment.146 If nothing else 
of note were accomplished, prodding the Congress to engage one of its specific 
duties is justification enough for the action of the SCOTUS. Regardless of the 
eventual legislative result or lack thereof. The result of this effort was a bill that 
said in part that the SCOTUS “shall not have the right to review the action of a 
Federal court or a State court of last resort concerning… complaints…seeking to 
apportion or reapportion any legislature of any State of the Union or any branch 
there of…”147 This bill made it out of the House but died in the Senate.148 In the 
end, we see that Wesberry was highly influential in many areas, especially in 
concluding that the Constitutionality of districts was an area of judicial 
concern.149 
Once again, we see the court addressing an idea of basic fairness, as many 
would define it, the idea that one person’s vote should be equal to another’s. The 
legalistic arguments against such, while having merit on an intellectual level, fail 
when one applies this basic idea. Similarly, we find repugnant ‘legal’ corruption; 
indeed, this is a case of that. The legalism we continue to see applied by the 
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dissenting opinions, in this case, continues to ignore the fiduciary role of 
government. Indeed, the focus of the dissenters seems to be concern about the 
fine points (however important they might be) rather than the larger issues these 
cases represent, and the danger to the polity seems to be of no concern. Pierson 
highlights a comment by Justice Harlan that is worth noting here in referring to 
the decision in Wesberry “cannot but encourage popular inertia in efforts for 
political reform through the political process...".150 This passage seems to say that 
Justice Harlan was hostile to popular efforts at political reform. If this is the case, 
then one must wonder where reform should originate if not from the popular 
will? Such an attitude smacks of elitism that our nation has rejected repeatedly 
from its founding. 
If Wesberry is considered influential, Reynolds v. Simms (1964) should be 
considered in the same league.151 The plaintiffs, who were residents of counties 
that had grown much faster than most since the apportionment in 1901, argued 
that they were subject to serious discrimination in representation due to the State 
of Alabama’s apportionment scheme that relied on county lines and population 
as determinants.152  This scheme might seem reasonable until one finds that the 
populations used were from 1900. None of the parties involved argued to keep 
the original apportionment. Reapportionment plans had been considered at the 
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state level, and a three-judge panel found none of them acceptable. State officials 
appealed to the SCOTUS arguing the District Court had erred in finding the 
reapportionment plans unconstitutional and that a Federal Court lacks 
jurisdiction.153 Two groups of plaintiffs appealed the ruling, one based on the 
District Court not reapportioning the State Senate based on population and the 
other complaining that it did not reapportion both houses on that basis.154  
In 1965 Congress passed the Voting Rights Act.155 Arguably one of the 
most significant pieces of legislation in American history. It codifies racial 
equality in aggressive and even coercive ways. There have been several 
amendments and judicial clarifications since its passage, but we will confine 
ourselves to 1965 for the moment. The two most contested sections of the Act are 
sections two and five.156 Section Two “… protects racial minorities against denial, 
abridgment, and dilution of the right to vote.”157 The broad language of Section 
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Section Five of the Voting Rights Act was even more contentious for its 
coercive nature. Except for Arkansas and Tennessee, the entirety of the South fell 
under Section Five’s rules, which requires states to get federal approval in 
advance (preclearance) for any changes affecting voting systems.158 The 
contemporaries of the times found that “…the Voting Rights Act to have brought 
"amazing progress" in registering Blacks to vote in comparison with the eight 
years of extensive Justice Department litigation…”159 There was broad support in 
the government before the passage of the Act as well, “The U.S. Solicitor General 
finds the proposed act necessary because of widespread violation of the Fifteenth 
Amendment,” despite the "possibility of major changes in present distribution of 
state and federal responsibility for elections."160 Admittedly there was no 
shortage of opposition, “…the act erodes the basic concepts of constitutional 
government in which individual states are acknowledged to be sovereign. 
Assesses the act to be both unconstitutional and discriminatory.”161 This 
controversy is not surprising considering the questions of federalism that the Act 
raises. Can the Federal government impose such measures on ‘sovereign’ states? 
Does the Fifteenth Amendment grant such power? Etc. This Act initiates a long 
list of legislation and litigation, on the subject of apportionment and others, that 
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continues into the next century. In the end, as Engstrom notes, the result was “In 
the mid-1960s, the U.S. Supreme Court outlawed malapportioned electoral 
districts for both state legislatures and the U.S. House of Representatives.”162 
Political scientists had also begun taking note of the incumbency effect and 
began to examine the factors surrounding increased reelection of politicians.163 
The incumbency effect is the rising reelection of candidates first discussed in the 
1960s.164 With racial gerrymandering being addressed, other considerations of 
apportionment come to the fore.  
The Era of the ‘Manageable Standard’  
After much consideration on issues of race, population, and other issues, 
the Court, in 1986, begins to at long last consider partisan gerrymandering. In the 
past, this question was tabled in favor of more pressing malapportionment issues. 
The seed for the manageable standard problem is planted in Baker v. Carr 
though its era does not flower for over twenty years after the decision. The reason 
for this is before 1986; the SCOTUS was involved in other areas of apportionment 
litigation that did require reference to the political question doctrine in the way 
that partisan gerrymandering does. Other cases were brought that go into other 
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areas of apportionment during this era as well. Cases concerned the population of 
districts and the allowable variations in populations, the use of districting 
commissions, and further refinements on racial considerations. This thesis 
forgoes the exploration of these as they do not apply to what it asserts is the most 





Case Impact Year 
Davis v. Bandemer Reinforces the 
justiciability of these 
cases but can find no 
reasonable measurable 
standard by which to 
judge 
1986 
Vieth v. Jubelirer The majority finds that 
the lack of a measurable 
standard renders these 
questions non-
justiciable, but the 
Dissent is not ready to 
close the door. 
2002 
Gill v. Whitford Opened the door to the 
‘Efficiency Gap’ measure 
2018 
Rucho v. Common Cause 
& Lamone v. Benisek 
The majority still holds 
that the questions are 
not justiciable. Minority 
continues to exhort the 
majority to accept 




Davis v. Bandemer – 1986, is the first case that the SCOTUS considers 
political gerrymandering. Other cries declaring their entry into the mire were 
premature in that those cases considered population-based or racial 
apportionment. Here, we find the Justices thinking about overtly partisan 
schemes.165 The apportionment scheme found in Indiana at the time provided for 
a mix of single and multimember districts.166 The electoral results of the 
 




apportionment are shown in Figure 3. Though the Democrats received the 
majority or a near parity of votes in many cases, their representation at the 
Indiana state legislature was not in line with the results:   
In November 1982, before the case went to trial, elections 
were held under the new plan. Democratic candidates for 
the House received 51.9% of votes cast statewide, but only 
43 out of the 100 seats to be filled. Democratic candidates 
for the Senate received 53.1% of the votes cast statewide, 
and 13 out of the 25 Democratic candidates were elected. In 
Marion and Allen Counties, both divided into multimember 
House districts, Democratic candidates drew 46.6% of the 
vote, but only 3 of the 21 Democratic candidates were 
elected.167 
 




“This picture is from 1981 Republican redistricting plan for Indiana House. Source: Case files of 
Justice Lewis Powell, Washington and Lee University School of Law.”168     
 
 




The District Court found for the Democrats based on the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. The GOP was not satisfied and sought 
relief in the SCOTUS.169 In Davis, we see a significant difference from previous 
apportionment cases. The court states plainly that such claims are justiciable 
under the Equal Protection Clause.170 Simultaneously, they found that this case 
was only based on the idea of a fair contest, ‘does one group have the same 
chance to elect representatives as others?’ Other questions were excluded from 
consideration. Apportionment that makes a successful election more ‘difficult’ for 
one political party does not make the distribution unconstitutional.171 Thus, the 
court continues the idea that political considerations in apportionment are 
acceptable motivations. The court refused to speculate about the quality of 
representation that Democratic voters might receive in this case. Finding that the 
case lacked evidence of a continuing, systematic dilution of votes or degraded 
representation, it reversed the lower court’s decision.172  
Additionally, the court said that an absence of proportional results from an 
election was not sufficient evidence of vote dilution.173 We find that the court was 
very concerned with finding a reasonable and applicable judicial standard, fully 









this concern, they were unable to find a manageable standard. The 6-3 decision 
found us with political gerrymanders justiciable but gave them no sword to attack 
the beast. As Whitaker notes,  “Even after the verdict that partisan 
gerrymandering questions were justiciable in Davis v. Bandemer, the court 
continued to search for a measure that does not drag them deeper into the 
mud.”174  
In 2002 plaintiffs in Pennsylvania filed to stop implementation of a 
districting plan passed by the legislature that they alleged was an 
unconstitutional political gerrymander.175 The plan required several Democrat 
incumbents to run against each other and no Republicans to do the same.176  
After several visits to the court by the parties, the district court held that the final 
facts did not support the plaintiffs’ claim. In keeping with tradition, the plaintiffs 
sought relief in the SCOTUS. In 2003 arguments were heard, and in 2004 the 
court issued its opinion regarding Vieth et al. v. Jubelirer. The court rejected the 
plaintiffs’ claim. The finding was also crucial in that the majority noted that in the 
eighteen years since Davis, no court had found a standard to use in judging 
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14. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=114562673&site=ehost-
live&scope=site. 
175 U.S. District Court – Middle District of Pennsylvania 241 F. Supp. 2d 478 (M.D. Pa. 2003) 





partisan gerrymanders.177  The lack of a reasonable standard led four of the 
majority to assert that it was time to close the books on partisan gerrymandering 
and that it would remain forever a ‘political question.’178 The remaining five 
justices did not agree with this and stated so in their dissent, or in Justice 
Kennedy’s, case in a concurring opinion.179 The five to four opinion has not been 
viewed as ‘settled law’ by the nation.  
In the years since Vieth, there have been several cases refining our view of 
apportionment and how it can be accomplished. There have been refinements in 
the areas of racial considerations and the use of population as a district 
determinant. Two are of great consequence, LULAC v. Perry – 2006 & Arizona 
Legislature v. Arizona Redistricting – 2015. LULAC is important because it 
allows states to redistrict as often as the like as long as they do so after the 
decennial census as well. In Arizona Legislature, the court determined that states 
could use redistricting commissions and that voters have the power to choose to 
take redistricting power from the legislature.180  
In 2018 and 2019, three cases come before the SCOTUS concerned with 
partisan gerrymanders: Gil v. Whitford – 2018, Lamone v. Benisek – 2018, 
Rucho v. Common Cause – 2019. Gill v. Whitford was rejected due to a lack of 
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standing in a unanimous decision. However, in the ruling, there was some hope 
placed in the ‘efficiency gap’ measure developed by Stephanopoulos & McGhee.181 
Rucho v. Common Cause and Lamone v. Benisek were combined for the final 
decision.182  
Rucho v. Common Cause was a North Carolina case that asserted the 
redistricting map presented by the Republican-controlled state legislature was an 
impermissible partisan gerrymander.183 Lamone v. Benisek was a Maryland case 
in which the Democrat-controlled legislature was accused of attempting an 
impermissible partisan gerrymander.184 
With the latter two contests, we see the court again retreating from the 
question. The majority states plainly, “Partisan gerrymandering claims present 
political questions beyond the reach of the federal courts.”185 The majority makes 
no mention of the Efficiency Gap measure, merely stating that “None of the 
proposed “tests” for evaluating partisan gerrymandering claims meets the need 
for a limited and precise standard that is judicially discernible and 
manageable.”186 The majority continues saying it “neither condones excessive 
 
181 "Gil v. Whitford." Justia. Accessed July 11, 2019. 
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partisan gerrymandering nor condemns complaints about districting to echo into 
a void.”187 The opinion concludes holding out hope for an answer to the problem 
from states or Congress.188 In the dissent, Justice Kagan (with Justices Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor) criticized the majority 
opinion for not addressing “the most fundamental of . . . constitutional rights: the 
rights to participate equally in the political process, to join with others to advance 
political beliefs, and to choose their political representatives.” 189 Arguing that by 
not stopping political gerrymandering, the Court “encourage[s] a politics of 
polarization and dysfunction” and “may irreparably damage our system of 
government.”190 Further arguing that “limited and precise standard” adopted in 
lower courts do meet the requirements the majority demands, but cannot seem to 
find.”191 As this was a five to four decision, partisan gerrymandering will continue 







192 For a more complete discussion on the use of the majority decision method in courts I suggest 
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Discussion    
The purpose here is to bring together some of the normative items in each 
era. In the Era of Silence, we find the court ignoring foundational thoughts of the 
American polity (Locke) in favor of deference to Marshall. In reading the opinion 
in Marbury,  this is a reasonable conclusion. However, it is also reasonable to 
conclude that perhaps it was not Marshall’s intent that the ‘political question’ 
doctrine become one or that it be applied so very broadly, as we have seen the 
SCOTUS do in the intervening years. Moving to the Equal Rights Era, we find 
three cases of institutional tension or intercurrence are created in Reynolds.193 
The first is between the ideas of institutional exceptionalism and a strong 
expectation of judicial abstention, second is the contest between the use of 
standards and rules, and the third is between discussions of race and politics.194 
As noted previously, due to the opinion in the Marbury v. Madison case and the 
long history of judicial abstinence concerning ‘political questions,’ there is a 
strong impulse in this direction. Additionally, the idea that the court had the 
freedom or indeed the responsibility to act in these cases to “…regulate the Law of 
Democracy” was firmly settled in the mind of the court.195 This tension is still 
with us today.  The second intercurrence depends on who will bear the cost of 
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enactment, the judiciary, or the enforcement authorities.196 The former because 
of the effort to determine in advance the law’s content, and the latter because of 
the later efforts to determine content.197 The final intercurrence, that of 
determining the line between race and politics causes tension because the 
decision if an issue is one or the other can be the deciding factor in the 
outcome.198 In the end, Reynolds opened the entirety of our political system to 
judicial intervention.199 Finally, we find ourselves in an Era foundering on the 
rocks of terminology, or perhaps even on partisanship. The conservative majority 
is loath to intervein in partisan gerrymandering. It seems to have accepted that 
the subject is justiciable if only a reasonable and impartial measure can be found. 
The liberal minority asserts that such a measure has been found. Has the court 
succumbed to partisan pressure? Will it be able to address seriously the 
significant threat that partisan gerrymandering represents? The importance of 
this answer cannot be overstated. Americans of this century hold different views 
on corruption than those held at the founding of our country. Their tolerance is 
quite limited. The advent of social media and the ever-shortening news cycle limit 
the ability of politicians to pull the curtain on corruption. The court must act lest 
our ingrained distaste for government lead us to political destinations the nation 
is not interested in visiting.  
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Our history is rife with examples of attempts to gain power, for its own 
sake or corrupt motives. It also shows us that partisan gerrymanders are nothing 
new and were not even new when Elbridge Gerry found himself in the crosshairs 
of the Boston Globe. Using gerrymanders to accomplish these ends is seen by 
politicians as a legitimate approach. Research on corruption in government does 
not seem to support their view.  
Chapter Two: The Manageable Standard and the 
Political Question Doctrine  
Introduction 
In consideration of gerrymandering as a form of corruption, it is important 
to understand the background of the current controversy. This chapter does this 
by examining the pedigree of the ‘Manageable Standard’ and its sire the Political 
Question Doctrine (PQD). This chapter also examines two categories of cases that 
fall under the PQD. When considering the PQD, there was no real guidance from 
the court until Baker v. Carr. In Baker, Justice Brennan provided six criteria for 
a legal claim to be rendered nonjusticiable.200 They are: 
1. A textual constitutional commitment of the matter to 
another branch of government, such as the power of the 
 




President in foreign affairs “(note that later cases did not 
strictly adhere to this view)”201; 
2. A lack of judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards for resolving the issue; 
3. A need for an initial policy determination before 
addressing the matter that courts would not be able to 
reach; 
4. A situation in which independent court action would 
violate the separation of powers framework; 
5. An unusual need to strictly adhere to a previous political 
decision; or 
6. A possibility that clashing statements on an issue by 
multiple branches of government would cause 
embarrassment. 
 
These six standards require some clarification. The first of the criteria is an 
extension of the Constitution’s explicit powers wielded by a single branch of 
government. For example, Article I, section 8, enumerates many powers reserved 
for Congress, including its power to levy taxes, borrow and coin money, and 
regulate foreign and interstate commerce.  
The second criterion is the one that is most in the headlines today. This 
criterion refers to the need for standards or rules to resolve an issue. There are 
two types of these, a ‘bright line’ standard and “balancing tests.”  
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Bright-line rules are saying to the judiciary and litigants, “you can go this 
far and no further.” We find an excellent example in the exclusionary rule 
established in Weeks v. United States(1914). The rule prevents the use of 
evidence seized without a warrant in the prosecution of an accused person. 202 
Balancing tests are more subtle, for example, the discussion of the contest 
between freedom of religion and states compelling interests in Sherbert v. 
Verner(1963) “We must next consider whether some compelling state interest 
enforced in the eligibility provisions of the South Carolina statute justifies the 
substantial infringement of appellant's First Amendment right.”203 The Court 
seeks to balance these two considerations to arrive at a decision.    
The third criterion requires that either the legislative or executive branch 
to make a policy decision before the court can rule on its merit. In other words, it 
is not the Courts’ role to establish policy, and thus the court cannot rule in a case 
that has yet to be defined in law.  
Similarly, the fourth criterion prevents the court from straying into the 
violation of the separation of powers. The court cannot rule in such a way as to 
intrude or allow another branch to encroach on the authorities as assigned in law 
or the Constitution. For example, the court could not rule that determining the 
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times and places of elections for the House of Representatives falls to the 
Executive branch as this power is exclusively assigned to that body. 
 
The fifth criterion allows for unusual circumstances where adherence to a 
previous decision is necessary. For example, Justice Brennan remarks that there 
is a need for certainty in enactments and that the court should not be a vehicle for 
promoting disorder.204 Finally, the last criterion seeks to avoid conflict among the 
branches of government — for instance, the Court questioning a diplomatic policy 
that is not covered by law or policy.205   Before we dig further into the PQD, we 
should discuss from whence it came. We will start with Judicial Review. 
Judicial Review 
The PQD has its beginning in Marbury v. Madison’s judicial review. 
Judicial review is “…the idea, fundamental to the US system of government, that 
the actions of the executive, legislative branches of government and the state 
governments are subject to review and possible invalidation by the judiciary.”206   
In discussions of Judicial Review, those that question its validity neglect to 
mention that judicial review was a concept established between 527C.E. - 533C.E 
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in the Justinian Code.207 Its pedigree in English Common Law, Clinton notes, 
well established through Blackstone.208 Further, it was well established in 
Colonial America. For example, in Federalist 78, Alexander Hamilton discusses 
judicial review, and it was further discussed in Calder v. Bull (1798).209  The first 
time we see legislation set aside for unconstitutionality is in 1787 in Bayard v. 
Singleton.210 In the United States, a nation whose sovereign is ‘The People’, the 
support for Judicial Review must be different, and this cannot be emphasized 
enough, than the justification in a nation whose sovereign is a single person. In 
Federalist No. 78, Hamilton explains the Federalist view of the role of the courts; 
they are to stand “…as an intermediate body between the people and the 
Legislature…”211 The court is present to defend the individual from the state. The 
court is to provide a check on the other two branches ensuring they do not act in 
ways that are not allowed in the Constitution.212 Historian Jon Meacham 
summed up our need for checks and balances quite well, ‘A guiding idea of the 
framers is that we are imperfect, that we would give in to desires and 
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ambition.’213 Another point he made, even though he is talking about 
impeachment, applies here as well ‘…George Mason of Virginia asked, “Shall any 
man be above, Justice?”214 This is as true for the Legislative as for the Executive 
branch. The check provided by the courts on the other branches, entirely human 
failures, is essential in a republican nation, even though the Court is not a 
democratic institution. Some discussion of this point is prudent. 
In Federalist 51 we find discussion of the need each branch to be 
independent “…members of each department should be as little dependent as 
possible on those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to their offices. Were 
the executive magistrate or the judges, not independent of the legislature in this 
particular, their independence in every other would be merely nominal.”215 
Moreover, again, in Federalist 78, focusing here on the judiciary, “The complete 
independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential…”216 This 
independence is further discussed in Federalist 80, reinforcing the need for an 
independent judiciary. The idea of a limited government is essential. Thus, we are 
told: “in practice no other way than through the medium of courts of justice, 
whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the 
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Constitution void.”217 The central idea is that it is the Constitution that is 
supreme. Not the Legislature, the Executive, or the Judiciary. To ensure the 
supremacy of the Constitution, the power of Judicial Review is necessary. It 
allows the Court to intercede (when requested) when the other branches have 
exceeded their Constitutional bounds.218 
By the time we reach the Marshall Court, we can see that the idea is not a 
new concept at all. One might even say that it is a settled question in the minds of 
the people of the early Republic. Indeed, John P. Frank said that Marshall was 
‘…so faithful to the Framers and Constitution that it is no longer a fruitful subject 
to discuss’.219 Of course, there is the question of which framers?220 We are certain 
he aligned with Hamilton and the rest of the Federalists. His continuing enmity 
with Jefferson shows the two gentlemen did not share the same view of the 
correct path for the nation.221  
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The concern about the limits of Judicial Review with regard to the 
prerogatives of the political branches of government, most notably the 
legislature, was of great interest to our early leaders. The judiciary of the time 
repeatedly comments that it should only declare an act of the legislative branch 
unconstitutional when there was no reasonable doubt222 of its 
unconstitutionality.223 Thus, the PQD stems from this ‘Doubtful Case’ doctrine.224 
The PQD seeks to help the court limit its involvement in the business of the other 
‘political’ branches. Here the term ‘political’ refers to those branches who are 
elected and held accountable at the ballot box.  
Today, we have developed other limits on the concept of Judicial Review. 
These limits are of similar nature, either falling into ‘…general rules of prudence 
or self-restraint.’225 The PQD is an expression of both. In the criteria for the PQD 
from Baker v. Carr, we can see these concepts. Essentially, the limits above ask, 
“…is it prudent for the court to act in this way?” or “...should the judiciary 
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exercise self-restraint due to some other factor?” The answers to these questions 
depend on the case at hand. These broad categories outlined by the questions 
above deserve some more detailed discussion.  
Justices starting with Marshall and continuing to the present day adhere 
to the idea that the court must take those cases which fall in its jurisdiction and 
must not involve itself outside that jurisdiction.226  The ‘Doctrine of Strict 
Necessity’ requires that the court avoid ruling on constitutional cases except in 
the most precise application of the facts and when no other means of resolving 
the question are available.227 Alternatively, to say it another way, the court must 
only involve itself in a constitutional question when no other means of resolution 
is possible.228  
Next, we have the Doctrine of Clear Mistake.229 This doctrine is a modern 
interpretation of the Doubtful Question Doctrine mentioned previously.230 It is 
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228 It is reasonable to ask, “How long should we wait for the normal course of action to remedy the 
situation?” The amount of time we must wait varies according to the urgency of the issue. Some 
issues will want immediate resolution and others can wait for an election cycle. The choice to wait 
or act though really depends on the litigants bringing the case to court. There are often times that 
they choose not to do so for reasons of their own or because their interpretation of the laws in 
question lead them to believe they have other remedies that will resolve the situation more 
quickly. 
229 Ibid 
230 Thayer, James B. "The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional 





related to the PQD but is not so specific as it.231 Like the PQD, there are 
limitations to it. First, the court can decide to ignore it.232 Second, the structure of 
the court limits the PQD. Justices can and do disagree on the nature of questions. 
Thus, the majority can apply this doctrine over the opinions of the rest of the 
court.233  
Related to the Doctrine of Clear Mistake is the Presumption of 
Constitutionality.234 The court should enter its deliberations with the assumption 
that the action taken by other branches is within the bounds of the Constitution. 
Another sibling of the Doctrine of Clear Mistake is the Disallowance by Statutory 
Interpretation.235 The court should construe the interpretation of legislation with 
the intent of sustaining its constitutionality.236 To say it in another way, if there is 
a way to read legislation that makes it constitutionally allowable, read it in that 
way.237 It should also separate the portions that it finds unconstitutional from 
 
231 See note 22 
232 The court is not bound by these doctrines as we are bound by for instance, laws on speed 
limits. The doctrines are guideposts for the court and can, if the court chooses, be ignored or even 
struck down. 






237 As mentioned previously, there are concerns that the application of this doctrine would make 
Judicial Review nothing more than ink on a page. See note 22 for more on this. 
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those that are constitutional.238 This is the notion that the court should enter its 
deliberations with the presupposing that legislation is Constitutional.  
Another ‘constraint’ on Judicial Review is the Exclusion of Extra-
Constitutional Texts. The concept that the SCOTUS must only focus on the 
Constitution in its deliberations. It should not consider other factors such as 
“motives, policy, or wisdom or with its concurrence with natural justice, 
fundamental principles of government, or the spirit of the Constitution.”239 This 
is another restraint that does not seem to be very stringent or indeed employed 
very often. The reference to decisions from other nations, and to documents other 
than the Constitution of the United States is quite common. Concerns about the 
intent of actors across the spectrum of consideration are the norm rather than the 
exception.240  
Finally, we have the concept of Stare Decisis.241 The common term for this 
is ‘precedent,’ the court is expected to adhere to previously considered cases 
“…because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be 
settled than that it be settled right…”242 Stare Decisis is not a hard and fast rule, 
however. If the court thinks a decision is in error, it will set that decision aside.243 
 




240 Ibid (As an example see the dissent in Rucho v. Common Cause) 
241 Ibid - “Limitations on the Exercise of Judicial Review." 
242 Ibid 
243 Ibid Notes 790 & 791 are very useful here 
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The adherence to precedent seems to be waning. Justice Thomas has been critical 
of the concept for quite some time, and his recent opinion in Gamble v. the 
United States (2019) provides us with this clarifying passage:  
I write separately to address the proper role of the doctrine 
of stare decisis. In my view, the Court’s typical formulation 
of the stare decisis standard does not comport with our 
judicial duty under Article III because it elevates 
demonstrably erroneous decisions—meaning decisions 
outside the realm of permissible interpretation—over the 
text of the Constitution and other duly enacted federal law. 
244    
 
Additionally, in  Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and 
Municipal Employees (2018), Justice Alito gives us a litany of reasons for not 
applying Stare Decisis. They range from decisions in error concerning First 
Amendment freedoms to lack of jurisdiction in Article 3 of the Constitution to 
poor reasoning.245 With our understanding of Judicial Review broadened, we can 
now consider its offspring, the Political Question Doctrine. 
The Political Question Doctrine 
The lineage of the PQD is quite long, illustrated in Fig 4. for convenience. 
The pedigree ends with the ‘Manageable Standard’ because, at this point, the 
court has ruled that it cannot find such a standard, and the controversy is non-
 
244 “Gamble v. United States (2019)” Accessed 7 Dec, 2019 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/587/17-646/case.pdf 
245 “Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (2018)” Alito 





justiciable. It might also end, at some future date, when such a standard is 
perceived and accepted. We should also note that Judicial Review is different 
across the different government types. It serves to limit some aspect of 
government in each case. The difference is what part of government is limited 
and how. There are other concerns about Judicial Review in a Constitutional 
Republic, and we will discuss them later. 
 
As mentioned previously (repeated here for ease of reference), the PQD 
comes to us from Chief Justice Marshall via Marbury v. Madison (1803):  
Questions, in their nature political or which are, by the 
Constitution and laws, submitted to the Executive, can 
never be made in this court.246  
 
 




Marshall us to consider the fundamental questions in a case, and this 
serves to limit the use of the PQD. Here Marshall is telling us if the Executive 
violates the law (either the Constitution or other laws), the Court has jurisdiction. 
Later in the case, we find this, “The subjects are political. They respect the nation, 
not individual rights, and, being entrusted to the Executive, the decision of the 
Executive is conclusive.”247 However, another explanation is, the decisions that 
do not affect an individual but instead are the business of the nation are beyond 
the reach of the court. There are hints of the view of the scope of the PQD in 
contemporaneous decisions, as examples – Ware v. Hylton (1796) & Martin v. 
Mott(1827).248 In Ware, the court refused to pass judgment on a case involving 
payment of debts. To do so would have required them to declare if a treaty had 
been broken. This was something the Court did not feel was within their ability to 
decide.249 In Martin, the court said that when the President was acting under the 
authority of the Congress, it was not for them to determine when or if he could 
call up the militia.250 Other than the noninterference views of the PQD illustrated 
above, there is another interpretation that we can consider.  
 
247 Ibid 
248  "Political Questions." Accessed Nov 9, 2019. https://law.justia.com/constitution/us/article-
3/22-political-questions.html. 
249  "Ware V. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199 (1796)." . Accessed Nov 9, 
2019. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/3/199/. 
250  "Martin V. Mott, 25 U.S. 19 (1827)." . Accessed Nov 9, 
2019. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/25/19/.; both Ware and Martin were found 
via "Political Questions." . Accessed Nov 9, 2019. https://law.justia.com/constitution/us/article-
3/22-political-questions.html. There are other cases at the time as mentioned in "The Doctrine of 




To add to the discussion of the PQD and its import, considering the place 
of the Judiciary in the American system is important. The elected or political 
branches of government are agents of the Sovereign (the People); therefore, the 
powers entrusted to them are primary. They act in the name of the people. The 
court must not interfere with their duties unless their actions are contrary to the 
Constitution. The court must ask itself, “Does this question revolve around a 
power given to another branch of government in the Constitution, or does it in 
some way damage an individual’s Constitutionally guaranteed rights?”  
 Marbury, famously, first articulates, in the annals of the Supreme Court 
of the United States (SCOTUS), the concept of Judicial Review.251 The PDQ is of 
the same pedigree and acts as a limiting factor on Judicial Review. The PQD was 
established in Marbury even though it was not applied there, and the court 
decided the case on other grounds. There are other cases where the Marshall 
Court applied the PQD, particularly Foster v. Neilson & United States v. Palmer, 
both foreign relations cases.252 The paper discusses the various limiters on 
 
251 Clinton, Robert Lowry. Marbury V. Madison and Judicial Review. Lawrence, Kan.: University 
Press of Kansas, 1989. See Pp. 76-77 discussing the view of Judicial Review at the time. An ally of 
Jefferson and Anti-Federalist views is quoted as first asserting the view we find in Marbury. 
Though the question in Marbury was not of great significance, this is where many will mark 
American Judicial Review’s start. 





Judicial Review below. Initially, it covers some background on the matter at hand 
in Marbury and the concept of Judicial Review.253  
This paper has been referring to Marbury V. Madison for a number of 
pages now, and the intent was to maintain focus on the impact of the decision. 
Some discussion of the details of the case is pertinent to frame the consideration 
of the case. Mr. William Marbury asked the court to force the Secretary of State, 
Madison, to deliver documents relating to Mr. Marbury’s commission as a Justice 
of the Peace.254 The appointment took place under what, some, consider dubious 
circumstances. The appointments were made and signed at the last moments of 
the outgoing administration’s term and intercepted at the first moments of the 
incoming administration’s time. The certifier would become the next Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court. In other words, John Marshall was the Secretary of 
State and was in the process of setting his signature and seal to the new judge’s 
commissions. The incoming Secretary of State stopped him from completing this 
task at the stroke of midnight.255 The decision in Marbury is twofold, first that 
the mandamus (an order to perform an action that the person should as part of 
 
253 For a more complete treatment of Judicial Review and Marbury I recommend - Robert Lowry 
Clinton’s Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Review. Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 
1989.  
254 "Marbury v. Madison." Oyez. Accessed October 21, 2019. https://www.oyez.org/cases/1789-
1850/5us137. 







the usual duties) requested would be an appropriate remedy, second that the 
SCOTUS could not issue it because it lacked jurisdiction.256 The very fact that 
Justice Marshall did not recuse himself from the case in question leads one to 
wonder at his motivations.257 The details of Marbury aside, Judicial Review was 
not a new concept at the time. As the PQD has developed over the years, a review 
of the litigation related to it or applying it is in order. 
Literature Review 
The debate over the breadth and scope of the power of Judicial Review in 
the United States has continued since the framing of the Constitution.258 
Alexander Hamilton argued that without a check on the Executive and Legislative 
branches along with the state governments, there would be no point in having a 
Constitution.259 While Patrick Henry countered, saying such a court would render 
the other two branches irrelevant.260 Today, some are still concerned about 
judicial overreach and activism enabled by judicial review and barely constrained 
 
256 The latter portion of the decision is the most controversial since the court’s decision required it 
to invalidate part of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (Section 13) that extended its jurisdiction into these 
and other cases. The conflict is with the U.S. Constitution’s, Article III, Section 2. 
257 Both Pennoyer (note 13 above) and Parker describe the events surrounding the events that led 
to Marbury as being rather undignified and do not paint either Jefferson or Marshall in a positive 
light during this time. See especially Pp 194-195 from Pennoyer. Junius Parker refers to him at 
this moment as the “matchless judge” Parker, Junius. "The Supreme Court and its Constitutional 
Duty and Power." American Law Review no. 3 (1896): Pp 361. The circumstances here, do not 
support this view. He plainly had a personal interest in the case. This could be considered a bit of 
presentism as there seem to be no calls for recusal in the literature reviewed that considered the 
contemporary documents.  
258 Supra note 251, Clinton 
259 Parker, Junius. "The Supreme Court and its Constitutional Duty and Power." American Law 
Review no. 3 (1896). Pp 359 
260 Ibid Pp 360 
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by the PQD.261 Others decry the PQD as having an “obsequious” level of deference 
to Congress and the President.262 The Court can also go wrong. In those cases, 
justices can be encouraged to retire from the bench or be impeached and 
removed. There are other aspects to Judicial Review still being debated, but they 
are not central to our discussion about the Manageable Standard Doctrine and its 
sire the PQD.  
PQD Litigation  
As in the last chapter, an analysis of litigation will broaden our grasp of the 
current situation. Here we will look at the major cases where the PQD was 
employed or considered and rejected. To examine litigation, there are two 
categories the thesis focuses on ‘Republican Form of Government’ and 
‘Enactment or Ratification of Laws.’263 The first is used solely to highlight the 
place the Judiciary has in ensuring the government is aligned with the 
Constitution. The second, ‘Enactment or Ratification of Laws’, is where most 
redistricting cases fall. 
 
261 "Has the Supreme Court Gone Too Far?" . Accessed Apr 22, 
2020. https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/james-wilson/has-the-supreme-court-
gone-too-far/. 
262 This reference chosen mainly for the strength of the objection to current application of the 
PQD – Cohen, Harlan Grant. "A Politics-Reinforcing Political Question Doctrine." Arizona State 
Law Journal 49, no. 1 
(2017): http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=lft&AN=124229882&site=ehost
-live&scope=site. 
263 "Political Questions." Justia. Accessed Nov 9, 
2019.  https://law.justia.com/constitution/us/article-3/22-political-questions.html. 
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Republican Form of Government 
Luther v. Borden (1849) 
            This case would fall under the first category Republican Form of 
Government.264 In 1841 Rhode Island was still operating under the charter 
established by King Charles in 1663. It had not yet developed a new state 
constitution. By 1843 two different constitutions had been adopted, one by a 
voluntary convention of citizens and another by the state government that existed 
at the time.265 The issue before the court (for our purposes) boiled down to the 
power of Congress266 to determine if the State had established a Republican form 
of government. The court declined to judge on this idea because it was not (to use 
the modern term) justiciable, it was not within the jurisdiction of the courts’ 
powers. 
Further, the responsibility to protect the states from violence was given by 
Congress to the President.267 Justice Taney and the court saw no role for the 
courts in this matter, either through legislation or the Constitution. Were these 
prudent applications of the PQD as the justices so clearly explain in their various 
 
264 Ibid 
265 Adapted from “Luther v. Borden” Justia. Accessed Nov 7, 2019. 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/48/1/#tab-opinion-1956895 
266 United States Constitution – Article 4, Section 4, Clause 1 




opinions? Justice Woodbury, in his dissent, highlighted the problems with the 
court deciding the issue: 
Another evil, alarming and little foreseen, involved in regarding these as 
questions for the final arbitrament of judges would be that, in such an event, all 
political privileges and rights would, in a dispute among the people, depend on 
our decision finally. We would possess the power to decide against, as well as for, 
them, and, under a prejudiced or arbitrary judiciary, the public liberties and 
popular privileges might thus be much perverted, if not entirely prostrated.268 
 
Continuing his dissent, Justice Woodbury also quotes Hamilton in Federalist 77 - 
"Nor does the conclusion by any means suppose a superiority of the judicial to 
the legislative power. It only supposes that the power of the people is superior to 
both,"269  Dr. Ken Masugi does not agree with the application in of the PQD in 
Luther.270 He wrote that “By making legal positivism—the will of Congress—the 
test for what is ‘republican,’ Taney, I speculate, wished to denigrate the 
republican principles of the Declaration and then separate them from the 
Constitution.”271 His view is that it sets the stage for the woeful Dred Scott v. 
Sandford decision.  
If Taney intended to attack the Declaration and disconnect it from the 










Justice Douglas does not agree with Justice Taney. Justice Douglas wrote, “Today 
we would not say with Chief Justice Taney that it is no part of the judicial 
function to protect the right to vote…”273  This repudiation of the Luther decision 
has implications that we will discuss further in looking at Baker. Others have 
noted that Judicial Review, through Taney, is one of the reasons for the necessity 
of the Civil War.274 While this is true, we also must accept that human institutions 
are imperfect and will occasionally make mistakes. Judicial Review has worked to 
protect the rights of the people more often than perverted to a bad result.275 
Enactment or Ratification of Laws276 
Colegrove v. Green (1946) 
Colgrove is a reapportionment case wherein the complainants argued that 
an Illinois state law from 1901 that covered the apportionment of Congressional 
districts violated the United States Reapportionment Act of 1911.277 There are two 
 
273 The quote comes directly from Justice Douglas’s opinion in “Baker v. Carr.” Justia. Accessed 
July 28, 2019. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/369/186/ & there is reference to it in 
Schuchman, John S. "The Political Background of the Political-Question Doctrine: The Judges 
and the Dorr War." The American Journal of Legal History 16, no. 2 (1972): 111-125. 
doi:10.2307/844569. http://www.jstor.org/stable/844569. Which was the source of my initial 
search for the opinion. 
274 It was observed by a reviewer that it is odd to use the term ‘necessity’ in referring to the Civil 
War. While this may be so, it does reflect my view of the situation. I am not a scholar of that era, 
but I do not see any other way for it to have been resolved. The personalities, faced with the 
realities of the times, would have found it nearly impossible to resolve the situation in any other 
way. 
275 Many would disagree with this assessment. Just as in any contentious issue, reasonable minds 
will come to different conclusions. In any case, that debate is one for another paper. 
276 "Political Questions." Justia. Accessed Nov 9, 
2019.  https://law.justia.com/constitution/us/article-3/22-political-questions.html. 




questions here for us: from the court's perspective, is the idea of ‘One Man – One 
Vote,’ does the Constitution require that each person's vote count ‘equally’? 
Concerning the PQD, though, do the courts have jurisdiction to rule on what is a 
‘state’ matter? The complainants alleged that the districts lacked the 
requirements of equal population and compactness. As mentioned in Ch 1278, the 
four to three279 decision held that the court agreed with and would apply the 
same rationale as in Wood v. Broom; the question was a non-justiciable political 
question.280 Justice Rutledge discusses at some length, in a simultaneously 
dissenting/concurring opinion, that the need to avoid conflict with the political 
branches of government. In this case, the legislature is the branch assigned the 
duties in question, those of managing elections.281 However, as explained in 
Baker, he would have agreed with the dissent if there were sufficient time for 
Illinois to reconfigure their elections.282 This slim majority and the fact that one 
of its members was ready to declare for the other side make this a poor choice for 
reference in supporting a ruling of nonjusticiability. 
In the dissent, Justice Black states, “Here we have before us a state law 
which abridges the constitutional rights of citizens to cast votes in such way as to 
 
278 See Pp 27 in the previous chapter 
279 Justice Jackson was not involved in the decision 
280 “Wood v. Broom” Justia. Accessed July 28, 2019. 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/287/1/ 
281 Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution – "The times, places and manner of holding elections for 
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof; but the 
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such regulations. 




obtain the kind of congressional representation the Constitution guarantees to 
them." Additionally, he refers to the ‘political question’ claims in the majority and 
concurring opinions as a “…mere play on words.”283 The narrowness of the 
decision and the gulf of difference between the concurring and dissenting 
opinions illustrates the contentious nature of the question at hand and the lack of 
clarity when referencing PQD. 
Baker v. Carr (1962) 
The importance of Baker v. Carr to the discussion of the Political Question 
Doctrine is hard to overstate. The court, at long last, defines the boundaries of the 
doctrine. There is much discussion on if they do so effectively. The case itself is 
similar to Colgrove, in that a state (Tennessee here) was using outdated electoral 
district maps that failed to account for the change in population distribution, and 
the districts denied the plaintiffs equal protection as required in the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  
The questions in Baker were very similar to those in Colgrove. The 
difference in Baker is that the court took action to define the parameters of the 
PQD using the six criteria we discussed earlier. Justice Clarks’ concurring opinion 
was a veritable barrage of reasons for the court to take action. For example, he 





and has had over six hours' argument (three times the ordinary case) and has 
been most carefully considered over and over again by us in conference and 
individually -- no one, not even the State nor the dissenters, has come up with 
any rational basis for Tennessee's apportionment statute.”284 The dissent spends 
much time referring to the “…substantial body…” of work while ignoring 
significant portions of that body. For instance, its reliance on Colgrove ignores 
that, ‘…but for lack of time…’285, the decision could have been the opposite. 
Though the Constitution does not explicitly say that the concept of ‘One Man – 
One Vote’ is required, the Court has, fundamental fairness requires that each 
person’s vote count equally. There are limitations to this idea within our system; 
for example, the Electoral College allows for an imbalance in power. However, 
even that has come into question recently as we elected two of the last three 
Presidents without a plurality of the electorate voting for them. However, this is a 
discussion for another day. 
Additionally, Chief Justice Roberts noted in Rucho v. Common Cause, 
“The Federalists were, for example, concerned that newly developing population 
centers would be deprived of their proper electoral weight, as some cities had 
 
284 “Baker v. Carr” Justia. Accessed November 10, 2019. 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/369/186/ 
285 In his concurring opinion Justice Rutledge notes “The shortness of the time remaining makes 
it doubtful whether action could, or would, be taken in time to secure for petitioners the effective 




been in Great Britain.”286 Thus, equal representation has been part of the 
character of our nation from the start.287 
2018/2019 & the ‘Manageable Standard’ 
The cases here are considered together as the first, though a 
gerrymandering case, was rejected for want of standing. The latter cases were 
combined by the SCOTUS and decided together. All three of these cases fall 
under the Enactment or Ratification of Laws category as they are concerned with 
laws enacted in the various states: Gil – Wisconsin, Rucho – North Carolina, 
Lamone – Maryland.  
In 2018 the Court considered Gil v. Whitford,288 where it settled the 
concerns of standing for complainants in districting questions and opened the 
door for the Efficiency Gap measure of partisan gerrymanders; in the latter cases, 
they dismiss the use of this measure. During 2019, in both Rucho v. Common 
Cause and Lamone v. Benisek, the court stated the issue is not justiciable due to 
the lack of a ‘manageable standard’ as defined in Baker. They find that partisan 
based apportionment is allowed via a precedent provenance that reaches back to 
 
286 Majority Opinion – “Rucho v. Common Cause” Justia. Accessed October 28, 2019. 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/588/18-422/ 
287 It is true that the definition of equal representation has changed over the years but then so has 
our nation, for the better. The basic idea our founders had was equal representation as they 
counted who should be represented according to their times. Our times have a more inclusive 
definition, that still fits the basic concept. 




Davis v. Bandemer (1986).289 “Specifically, even if a state legislature redistricts 
with the specific intention of disadvantaging one political party's election 
prospects, we do not believe that there has been an unconstitutional 
discrimination against members of that party unless the redistricting does in fact 
disadvantage it at the polls.”290 (emphasis added) Further in Bandemer, we find 
“…we have found equal protection violations only where a history of 
disproportionate results appeared in conjunction with strong indicia of lack of 
political power and the denial of fair representation.”291  In Rucho, the court 
states, “Partisan gerrymandering claims rest on an instinct that groups with a 
certain level of political support should enjoy a commensurate level of political 
power and influence.”292 While this is accurate for the claims made, from a 
normative standpoint, a better claim might be that they should have a fair chance 
at having some political power. 
Despite the fact that the court finds “Excessive partisanship in districting 
leads to results that reasonably seem unjust.” and “…such gerrymandering is 
“incompatible with democratic principles,”293 Justice Kagan in the dissent notes, 
“The majority disputes none of what I have said (or will say) about how 
 
289 “Rucho v. Common Cause - Dissent” Justia. Accessed July 28, 2019. 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/588/18-422/ 
290 "Davis V. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986)." . Accessed Nov 17, 
2019. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/478/109/. 
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gerrymanders undermine democracy. Indeed, the majority concedes (really, 
how could it not?) that gerrymandering is “incompatible with democratic 
principles.”294(emphasis added) This decision was five to four along ideological 
lines. The current court has five justices that most would consider ‘conservative’ 
and four that most would consider being ‘liberal.’295 Thus, in this case, the five 
conservative justices comprised the majority. Due to the nature of SCOTUS 
precedent, we can expect that this will not be the end of the discussion.  
The application of the PQD  to redistricting has a long history. For most of 
our history, the court viewed redistricting as a political issue, and the courts had 
no place in it. The change in the view of redistricting occurred when the Civil 
Rights movement swept across the nation. There were other redistricting cases 
before the 1960s; however, none of them moved the court to act. When 
arguments demonstrated that reapportionment maps disenfranchised African 
Americans, the court struck them down.296 Partisan gerrymandering is and has 
been allowed. It is of note, though, that throughout our history, we have also 
complained that partisan malapportionment was wrong.  
 
294 Dissenting Opinion – “Rucho v. Common Cause - Dissent” Justia. Accessed October 28, 2019. 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/588/18-422/ 
295 Conservative Justices – Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, John Roberts, Clarence 
Thomas Liberal Justices – Ruth Bader Ginsberg, Stephen Breyer, Elena Kagan, Sonia Sotomayor 
296 See the discussion of this in the Litigation section of the previous chapter. Other redistricting 
decisions have been promulgated using One Man – One Vote, Equal Protection, and other 
rationales. The real change for the PQD though was with Baker.  
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Was this type of complaint merely ‘sour grapes,’ losers complaining about 
losing and using something that a layperson can easily view as evidence? It could 
be the case; however, one would think that if so, it would cease to be a compelling 
argument. Today’s concerns about this activity are sufficient to have pushed the 
House of Representatives to address it in legislation finally.297 Perhaps, we failed 
to do anything about it because we lacked the political will or that it was not 
enough of a violation of our sense of ‘fair play’ to motivate us? The problem with 
our current situation is that the ‘turnabout is fair play’ maxim no longer works 
when there is no ‘turnabout.’ The ability to redistrict at will and to use computers 
to define the layout of those districts to enshrine a particular continuing result 
prevents any but the remotest chances of change. Thus, we cannot count on the 
traditional ebb and flow of the political system. The oral arguments in Rucho are 
illuminating in this consideration; we will discuss them further below. The 
discussion of the choosing of maps, especially. 
Repeatedly the courts have said that partisan districting maps cannot be 
too extreme, but what is ‘too extreme’? The five-member majority in Rucho held 
that that the examples under consideration were not too extreme, Justice Kagan 
in discussing the same cases though charged,  “At its most extreme—as in North 
Carolina and Maryland—the practice amounts to rigging elections.”298 Not one 
 
297 Sarbanes, John P. "H.R.1 - 116th Congress (2019-2020): For the People Act of 2019." . 
Accessed Dec 8, 2019. https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/1. 




example of partisan reapportionment maps has been struck down, not for being 
‘too extreme,’ not for any reason. In the majority opinion in Rucho, Chief Justice 
Roberts notes, “This Court has not previously struck down a districting plan as an 
unconstitutional partisan gerrymander, and has struggled without success over 
the past several decades to discern judicially manageable standards for deciding 
such claims.”299 The opinion continues supporting this finding, citing precedents 
that say partisan apportionment is allowable under Constitution and that 
apportionment is an activity that is central to and inseparable from politics. 
When considering the search for a “politically neutral and manageable standard,” 
the opinion cites the difficulty (impossibility?) in defining the basic idea of 
fairness due to the many and variable definitions of the term. Chief Justice 
Roberts focuses on the broader questions brought by this case rather than the 
specifics in this instance. In the process, it seems that there is evidence he is 
ignoring. In reviewing the opinions in this case, it is safe to say that both sides 
indulge in hyperbole to make their points. In this case, the evidence does not 
support the conclusion of the court. The evidence cited by the dissent leaves little 
doubt that, in this case, we have a partisan gerrymander that has gone too far. 
Thus, America is saddled with a SCOTUS that claims to be searching for or has 






The search for a Manageable Standard, the Political Question Doctrine, 
and Judicial Review, are all about the rule of law. Are we a nation that is 
governed by laws, where no person, no branch of government, is above the law, 
or are we a nation of personalities, a nation of passion? This thesis asserts that 
the United States is ‘A nation of laws, not men.’300 In the arena of 
gerrymandering, the fundamental question about the PQD is, ‘Is it still valid?’ 
Setting aside the dismissal of blatant and excessive partisanship, ignoring the 
apparent evidence of reasonable, discernible standards, the court has affirmed 
again and again that it is not. The counterargument is that the current situation is 
the reasonable standard that the political solution is the answer. This reasoning 
ignores the problems the United States is faced with, though, as discussed in the 
conclusion of this thesis.  
  
 
300 Anonymous and John Adams. "The Constitution of Massachusetts." . Accessed April 16, 
2020. https://www.consource.org/document/constitution-of-massachusetts-1780-10-
25/20130122075650/. The actual phrase reads “…a government of laws, not of men.” The 
paraphrase above is a common adaptation. 
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Chapter Three: Equal Elections & Trust? 
Introduction 
The first chapter discussed the background of gerrymandering, its history, 
and the litigation around it at the Supreme Court level. The chapter illustrated 
that though it has been part of our history, we have also found it to be unfair. 
Gerrymandering is institutional corruption. Legal, but still corrupt. The second 
chapter looked at the modern litigation in more detail and discussed the current 
impediment to a ruling from the Supreme Court, the political question doctrine. 
This chapter discusses corruption and its impact on democratic institutions. It 
also looks at elections and constitutions more generally. The reason for this 
change in focus is to bring into consideration why gerrymandering matters and 
why the Court's inaction on it matters. 
A Threat to Democratic Institutions? 
Previous chapters discussed the idea of fundamental fairness we inherited 
from the English system and culture. Those chapters also noted that from the 
beginning of the nation, gerrymandering was viewed as unfair. It was tolerated as 
a political practice by voters because the government generally left people alone 
to live their lives and seek their fortunes. 
Yet as Norris et al. note, '…doubts about legitimacy may weaken 
confidence in elected institutions and generate disaffection with the overall 
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performance of democracy.'301 In elections in the United States, participation 
hovers between approximately 40 to 55 percent, and a main cause of this low 
number is voter apathy, the feeling that their votes do not matter.302 Various 
studies have found that voters in the United States express a relatively low level 
of satisfaction with democracy.303 Norris's model (Fig. 6, next page) illustrates 
the feedback loop for the importance of electoral integrity. It is similar to the 
vicious cycle concept asserted by Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, discussed below.304 
Feelings that elections are or are not legitimate, weaken, or enhance voters' faith 
in their government. As those feelings, for good or ill, strengthen participation 
decreases or increases accordingly.305 The cycle continues and can infect other 
segments of society, also discussed below.  
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The rule of law is central to our system. In Hayak's much-debated Road to 
Serfdom, there is this passage:  
Citizens can enjoy liberty only if the power of the state is 
circumscribed by law; that is, circumscribed by rules which 
specify limits on the scope of state action – limits based on 
the rights of individuals to develop their own views and 
tastes, to pursue their own ends and to fulfill their own 
talents and gifts.306 
 
This places Hayak's views solidly in line with Locke.307 There are many 
aspects of Hayak's work worth debating but debating the rule of law and its place 
in the American system is not. As shown in the chapter two, on the political 
 
306 Hayek, Friedrich A. von The Road to Serfdom. Chicago: University of Chicago press, 1944. 
307 Held, David. Models of Democracy. 3rd ed. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006 
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question doctrine, few think that gerrymandering is compatible with democracy. 
The debate now is how to address it.  
In discussions of government, it is common to look to the writings of the 
most influential founders, and rightly so. However, this tendency paints with an 
overly broad brush the larger body of the attendees of the Constitutional 
Convention. It helps us overlook the failures and flaws of that body. For example, 
slavery was accepted; this was a compromise that cost over one million lives. Was 
it worthwhile? The inability to form a government without the slave states might 
argue that it was. However, vanishingly few will agree that acceptance of slavery 
was…optimal. Greedy and corrupt intent was evident in the deliberations of the 
Constitutional Convention. Is it prudent then to accept that the document 
produced is without flaws? Instead, would it not be better to appeal to the better 
nature of those men and the document they created and seek to make a more 
perfect union indeed? There are other areas where the U.S. has failed to define 
corruption and these failures are not limited to the national government.  
Recent cases have seen the SCOTUS take a very legalistic view of 
corruption overturning the conviction of a governor in one instance.308 However, 
as shown by current efforts in the various states, inaction at the national level is 
 
308 Barnes, Robert. "Supreme Court Overturns Corruption Conviction of Former Va. Governor 






not indicative of voters' preferences. The American polity does not have to accept 
the corruption gifted to it by its forefathers. Among the Supreme Court justices, 
as noted in the last chapter, there is a movement to weaken the influence of and 
reliance on precedent. The framers expected those who came after to correct the 
framers' mistakes and gave them the means to do so without violence. Those 
tools have not always been sufficient, but that is no reason to fail to try. 
Gerrymandering may not violate the letter of the Constitution, but most 
assuredly violates its spirit. Like the abomination of slavery, the nation should 
also bury gerrymandering.  
With the immediacy of the news cycle, the instantaneous ability to 
communicate with the entire nation, and the concurrent ability to manipulate 
perceptions, the legitimacy of elections is more important than ever. America 
must defend them vigorously and actively lest those of ill intent act first to the 
nations’ detriment. By this point, identifying partisan gerrymanders as a form of 
corruption is stating the obvious. A discussion of corruption and its effects on 
democratic institutions should bring it all together.  
The Economist Intelligence Unit's 2016 report was the first time the 
United States as a "Flawed Democracy" with its score coming in at a 7.98 (for a 
country to be considered a "Full Democracy," a rating of 8.01 and above is 
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required).309 In 2019 the U.S. continued its slide, posting a score of 7.96.310 The 
data for trust in government in the U.S. shows a steep slide starting in 1965, it 
began with a score in the high 70's by 1980 is was just below 30. The average rose 
and fell, never exceeding 60, coming to rest in 2015 at approximately 20.  
There are many reasons for this low trust in government, but decisions in 
Korea, the Vietnam War, Watergate, and attacks on government in general from 
politicians' figure large in many minds. Actions by President Trump are 
significant in current perceptions of corruption. The litany of norms and even 
laws violated by the Trump administration, according to their accusers, would 
add several pages, at least, to this chapter. The seemingly constant criticisms 
from politicians take the government to task for inefficiency and corruption add 
to voters’ apathy. The politicians, in this instance, are cynically giving voice to the 
frustrations of voters that are not satisfied with what they see occurring in 
government as a whole (in some cases, the criticisms are genuine). They are also 
deflecting criticism of their work by blaming others. By giving a larger stage to 
these frustrations, regardless of their factual basis, politicians serve to amplify 
voters' feelings of dissatisfaction. This is a vicious cycle as described by Rose-
Ackerman & Palifka in Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and 
 
309 The Economist Intelligence Unit. Democracy Index 2016: Revenge of the “Deplorables”: The 
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310 The Economist Intelligence Unit. Democracy Index 2019: A Year of Democratic Setbacks and 
Popular 
Protest: The Economist, 2020. 
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Reform. This cycle is a self-reinforcing series of actions that undermine social or 
governmental trust, thus encouraging more corrupt behavior, and the cycle 
continues.311 This cycle can create a spiral effect, undermining faith in both 
government and the polity as a whole.312 The thesis finds further support for the 
impacts of corruption (and gerrymandering) in discussions of the concept of 
'Social Trust.' 
Social Trust 
Social Trust is a concept that has a that has an extensive amount of 
research, especially since the theory of social capital was advanced by Robert D. 
Putnam initially in 1993 and more comprehensively in 2000 with the publication 
of "Bowling Alone: the collapse and revival of American community." In most 
research, social capital has two components, 'social trust' and 'reciprocity.'313 
Bjørnskov & Svendsen refer to social trust as a generalized trust which extends to 
others based solely on shared national origin.314 Bjørnskov says that it is the 
"…degree to which people believe that strangers can be trusted…".315 Reciprocity 
 
311 Rose-Ackerman, Susan., Palifka, Bonnie J.,. Corruption and Government : Causes, 
Consequences, and Reform. Second ed. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2016. 
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313 Rothstein, Bo. "Corruption and Social Trust: Why the Fish Rots from the Head Down." Social 
Research 80, no. 4 (2013): 1009. 
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is simply the idea of mutually beneficial cooperation.316 This transactional view of 
human interactions or treating them as "homo economicus,"317 as Rothstein puts 
it, does not explain the many and consistent acts of compassion we see.318 
However, the evidence is that reciprocity, using the transactional nature of this 
definition, is of minimal importance.319 Thus, we come to the idea that social 
trust is the central component of social capital. 
 One reason for the interest in social trust is that, as 
measured in surveys, it correlates with a number of other 
variables that are normatively highly desirable. At the 
individual level, people who believe that in general most 
other people in their society can be trusted are also more 
inclined to have a positive view of their democratic 
institutions, to participate more in politics, and to be more 
active in civic organizations. They also give more to charity 
and are more tolerant toward minorities and to people who 
are not like themselves. Trusting people also tend to be 
more optimistic about their own ability to influence their 
own life chances and, not least important, to be more happy 
with how their life is going.  
We see the same positive pattern at the societal level. Cities, 
regions, and countries with more trusting people are likely 
to have better working democratic institutions, economic 





316 Rothstein, Bo. The Quality of Government : Corruption, Social Trust, and Inequality in 
International Perspective. Chicago ;London: University of Chicago Press, 2011. 
317 I cannot safely say that this term originated with Rothstein as I have also seen it in discussions 
of Behavioral Economics. 




individual and societal levels, many things that are 
normatively desirable seem connected to social trust.320 
 
The level of social trust is an essential indicator of where on the spectrum 
of development and democratization a society is due to the correlations and 
empirical evidence supporting those connections. Social capital thus, social trust, 
protects against vicious spirals and destruction of democratic institutions. The 
reverse is also true, the destruction of social capital or trust by institutional 
corruption (gerrymandering) damages the polity. 
Levels of Social Trust 
With the idea that social trust falls in a spectrum, some consideration of 
the idea that there are 'levels' of social trust, is in order. The gradations of trust 
from a particularized trust (trust in an individual built on past experiences) 
extending through what we call social trust, referring to trust for people in 
general with no set criteria. The range goes from a level of trust (or lack of it) that 
is generally not helpful (perhaps even harmful) to society, to a level of trust that is 
dangerous to the individual. In early Swedish society, there were levels of social 
trust that were, perhaps, uncommon for the times. Surely, granting tax collectors 
the power to set taxes according to the ability to pay was quite unusual in the 
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1500s?321 In consideration of social & political concepts, the idea that there is a 
spectrum of behaviors in any field is useful and applicable to the relationship 
between gerrymandering and damage to the American polity. Further, it is crucial 
to understand that there are blended variations of ideas within and among these 
behaviors. Too often, the desire for simplicity of conversation or ease of 
computation leads researchers to forget the range of phenomena represented by a 
β or an α.  
As is discussed throughout the literature, many think that social trust is 
dependent on some commonality of phenotype or culture. This idea, though, is 
refuted by more empirical studies. Recent research by several groups has shown 
that in developing and generating social trust, fairness, equity of treatment by the 
government, is the most critical factor "…perceptions of fairness are significantly 
correlated with social trust…"322 There are many correlations to high levels of 
social trust; some were mentioned above. These correlations run from prosocial 
behaviors to economic benefits. Among the prosocial behaviors, we see higher 
levels of civic engagement, ranging from volunteerism to higher voter turnout. As 
You notes, "Social trust is likely to affect corruption and inequality, because non-
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(2017): 439-458. doi:10.1080/03468755.2017.1349577. https://doi-
org.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/10.1080/03468755.2017.1349577. & Roberts, Michael. The Early 
Vasas: A History of Sweden 1523-1611. Cambridge, London: Cambridge U.P., 1968. 
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trusting people are less likely to stick to the rules of the game and societies with a 
higher social trust may find it easier to reach consensus on extensive 
redistribution and social insurance."323 Indeed, this is precisely what many 
researchers have found. Countries with high levels of social trust do show lower 
levels of economic inequality and corruption. 
The assertion here is that the levels of trust seen in homogenous societies 
are merely levels achieved with greater efficiency because of their homogeneity. 
As populations assimilate new members and ideas, leading to a blended culture, 
social trust is slower to develop. The fewer differences, the more quickly the 
groups achieve higher levels of social trust. Researchers in the field note that 
"Generalized trust enabling the provision of collective goods and governance can 
emerge even in dysfunctional states resulting from inclusive group identities in 
communities of overlapping memberships and people's experience with fair and 
impartial local institutions and governance."324 This is where governments play a 
role in building social trust. This is also where institutional corruption, like 
gerrymandering, undermines social trust. 
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Political trust is a concept related to social trust, and similarly, it is crucial 
for consideration here. Political Trust is trust in government and confidence in 
political institutions.325 This type of trust is differentiated from social trust 
because of its focus. Political trust focuses on an inanimate object. It is concerned 
with trust in something that is seen as faceless. One scholar observes, “The 
implication of this assurance is that parliaments (and states more generally) 
cannot meet their goals, cannot govern well, without a measure of public 
confidence.”326 Additionally, the same scholar posits that this trust is not 
unreserved or total, skepticism has an important place in a healthy democracy. 
Anecdotally one can observe this in the functioning of primary education. When 
parents interact with the teachers and administrators at their child's school, their 
trust in the school often increases. They have exchanged their weak trust in an 
institution for stronger particular trust in individual people. A possibly useful 
comparison is that it is hard to trust a building, less so to trust a person. Political 
trust is further removed because its focus often does not even have a persistent 
material object to serve as the focus of trust. It is related to other terms that 
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characterize citizens feelings about their governments.327 On the positive side, it 
is related to confidence, system support, and legitimacy.328 On the negative with 
cynicism, political disaffection, and alienation.329 As mentioned previously, 
voting is the central democratic action, and trust in the integrity of elections is 
fundamental to trust in democratic governments.330 An alternative definition has 
been proposed as well, "…the willingness to bear the immediate or expected 
material and ideological costs that arise from compliance with government 
action."331 This definition better defines the reality of political trust at the 
individual level. It operationalizes trust. This is important in considering the 
importance of political trust and could easily be altered to encompass social trust 
as well. The willingness to sacrifice something for the good of another without 
expectation of direct compensation. The graph below (Fig. 7) illustrates the 
declining trust Americans express in their government starting in 1964.332 The 
next chart (Fig. 8) documents Americans' trust by the branch of government.333  
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Percentage of U.S. citizens trusting the U.S. government 
over time. Entries are the weighted percentage of ANES 
face-to-face respondents saying that they trust the 
government most or all of the time. In 2008 and 2012, the 
ANES split sampled a new version of the question along 
with the original (red line), and in 2016, they carried the 
new question (blue line) only. The results show that the 
new question yields about 6–7% fewer trusting respondents 
than the old question. The original question is: How much 
of the time do you think you can trust the government in 
Washington to do what is right—just about always, most of 
the time, or only some of the time (with "never" coded if 
volunteered)? The new question is: How much of the time 
do you think you can trust the federal government in 
Washington to make decisions in a fair way—always, most 
of the time, about half of the time, some of the time (in 
2012–2016; once in a while in 2008), or never?334 
 
 




Confidence in U.S. institutions over time. Results are based 
on General Social Survey data collected during election 
years, when available, or during the following spring, when 
not. The confidence questions came in a battery introduced 
as follows: "I am going to name some institutions in this 
country. As far as the people running these institutions are 
concerned, would you say you have a great deal of 
confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any confidence 
at all in them?" Respondents were asked to indicate their 
confidence in the "U.S. Supreme Court" (red ), "Congress" 
(blue), and the "Executive Branch of the Federal 
Government" (orange). Entries are weighted means for 
confidence variables scored to range from 1 (hardly any 
confidence) to 3 (a great deal of confidence).335 
 
Kennedy found, "Popular opinion would seem to weigh in on the side of 
those who argue that partisan redistricting is unethical and has distorted the 
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electoral process."336 Further, Dr. Kennedy asserts that "gerrymandering is 
undermining democratic legitimacy by depriving voters of voice has political 
ramifications that may be difficult if not impossible to measure, but should not 
for that reason be dismissed as inconsequential. (As the Supreme Court noted in 
Shaw v. Reno (1993), reapportionment is one area in which appearances do 
matter.)"337 The view is, politicians no longer work for the voters and are instead 
in league with special and or corporate interests. This view is supported by data 
documenting the lack of responsiveness shown by the government to voters' 
concerns.338 Even a cursory search of the internet can find popular press supports 
for this idea as well. Another foray onto the internet can find widespread support 
for the assertion that the system is 'rigged.' There is empirical research that 
supports this concept, as well. The compounding of economic inequality with 
political inequality creates more of both; these both undermine political trust.339 
These findings correlate well with the concept that fairness is the most crucial 
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factor in growing social trust.340 Rigged elections lead to a decline in trust in 
government and democratic institutions.341 Gerrymandering or 
malapportionment should be included in the list of ways parties seek to suppress 
voters.342 Next  
1776, Pennsylvania 
Corruption and gerrymandering have been part of American history since 
the earliest days of the Republic, as seen in the chapter on the history of 
gerrymandering. There are other constitutions from our past that predate the 
United States Constitution and can shed light on our discussion. One of these is 
the Constitution for the state of Pennsylvania. In the gerrymandering case 
League of Women Voters, et al. v. the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, et al. – 
(2017), there is extensive discussion of Article 1, Section 5 of that Constitution, 
and the meaning of it.343 The majority in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 
decision discusses that the common standard is that elections are to be 'free and 
equal' and that the map drawn by the defendants violates that standard. The 
importance of free and fair elections is common in American political discussion. 
Thus why, cheating through gerrymandering, is damaging to the polity.  
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Pennsylvania sought to curb attempts to violate the ideal of free and fair 
elections as early as 1790, recognizing the need for strong institutions that would 
not be undermined by opportunism. The 1790 constitution also moderated some 
of the perceived excesses of the 1776 document by adding a second legislative 
body, bringing it in line with the United States Constitution.344 One of the 
motivations of the authors of Pennsylvania's first Constitution was to eradicate all 
elements of the monarchy from the American system.345 This motivation 
presented a clear threat to those accustomed to power.346 When considered by 
the light of these competing interests, the debates during the Constitutional 
Convention take on a different tone.347 
Further, in League of Women Voters, et al. v. the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, et al. – (2017), there is a discussion of why it is important to use 
clear, unambiguous, plain language, and to remove qualifications on, the 
standard for the state to have free and fair elections. There may be variations on 
what the terms' free' and 'equal' mean, but those variations will not vary in any 
significant way. The difference for our consideration is that the authors of the 
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Constitution did not plainly define how elections were to be conducted. Why 
would the framers overlook this? Did they cover so many other considerations 
only to ignore a central standard for the most important civic duty? Apparently, 
the framers did not address gerrymandering because, for some, it was not an 
issue in their minds. Free and fair elections were the standard, and it was as 
evident to them as the rising sun. For others, the experience in other states 
(markedly the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution) and the debate in Paine's 
Common Sense led them to seek to preserve their hold on power.348  Is the 
average citizen strongly invested in who particularly holds power? Alternatively, 
are they just concerned with how they wield it? The previous chapter discussed a 
more arcane standard accepted during the framers' era, in the same way, that of 
judicial review. If this legal standard was readily accepted (and documented), 
why the need to state something else that is obvious to the framers? The only 
reason is that the parties that George Washington warned us about would seek to 
hold power and subvert the will of the people at every opportunity. Thus, the 
supports for gerrymandering and dismissal of concerns about it.  
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In a 2016 survey, 60% of Americans reported their number one "Corrupt 
Government Officials."349 Fear of corruption beat the fear of terrorism by 20 
points.350 When bribery, graft, nepotism, extortion, fraud, and other forms of 
corruption come to light, Americans mostly call for prosecution. Americans' 
sought to combat corruption from the birth of the nation by including a clause 
from the Article of Confederation to the Constitution almost word for word. The 
Emoluments Clause of Article I, Section 9, prohibits any "Person holding any 
Office of Profit or Trust under [the United States]" from accepting "any present, 
Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or 
foreign State." Though Americans were well aware of the danger represented by 
corruption, that does not mean it was not a problem in the early days of the 
country.351  
Unfortunately, though America was well aware of the dangers of 
corruption from the outset, it has never been eradicated. Views of what is corrupt 
have become more refined and, as mentioned previously, activity that was 
tolerated in the past is now prosecuted. Additionally, prosecution of individual 
corruption is still uneven across all levels of the judicial system. The Supreme 
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Court recently took a very legalistic view of it when it overturned the conviction of 
a former Governor from Virginia.352 In Texas, about two years later, a former 
Congressman was found guilty of various forms of corruption.353 Generally, low-
level corruption (that found with average public servants) is not very common in 
the United States. That is not to say it is non-existent and institutional corruption 
can facilitate individual corruption. For example, Oklahoma had a system of 
County Commissioners that allowed these people to blatantly abuse their power 
to the point that the Federal government took over administration of the counties 
for an extended period. As of this writing Oklahoma represents an extreme 
outlier in prosecutions for corruption.354 However, there are some issues with 
grand corruption that have only been made worse in recent years. Grand 
corruption is corruption of higher-level public officials and includes perceived 
corruption i.e. campaign contributions for access and special interest 
influence.355 The United States has left things particularly murky concerning the 
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norms associated with Presidents. For example, it is the norm for presidential 
candidates to submit their tax returns for review, but there is no legal 
requirement for them to do so.356 Additionally, there is a long history of expecting 
Presidents to recuse or divest themselves of commercial enterprises during their 
time in office, yet again there is no legal requirement to do so.357 Attempts to 
address institutional corruption have been mixed, as noted previously. The 
Pendleton Act was effective for some types of institutional corruption, but 
gerrymandering has continued. 
The Supreme Court decisions in Citizens United et al. and others in 2010 
have created a definite perception of corruption in the electoral system.358 Zephyr 
Teachout paints a dramatic picture of a kind of corruption in her book, 
Corruption in America.359 When discussing the McCutcheon v. FEC decision (one 
of the other cases mentioned in discussions of the Citizens United case), Teachout 
highlights the shakiness of the decision opining, 'it is hard to know if the 
Supreme Court believes democracy can withstand the attack of money or if they 
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recognize the danger and think Congress is the more significant threat.'360 Grand 
or high-level corruption is something that is of great concern in the United States 
and addressing it will be a crucial factor in returning the U.S. to a 'Full 
Democracy' rating in the Economist Intelligence Units Democracy Index, 
discussed below. As mentioned above, Citizen's United et al. have created some 
serious concerns about electoral integrity.361 That said, when compared to other 
countries, these concerns are only developing. For example, Russia has rampant 
corruption down to the lowest levels of society.362 For documentation of the 
growth in corruption, a review of recent corruption and democracy indexes is 
instructive. 
Indexes and Reports from International Watchdog Organizations 
The ratings in these indexes and reports are not important in and of 
themselves. Rather what they represent is what is important. These ratings 
represent how people view a country, their country. These perceptions, as 
discussed previously, matter because of their impact on the strength of 
democratic institutions in a country. Gerrymandering undermines voters’ 
 
360 Ibid, Pp 304 
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feelings that elections are free and fair, thus creating concerns about electoral 
integrity.  
The United States ranking by Transparency International's Corruption 
Perception Index dropped a place to 23 as its rating fell to 69 (incidentally, the 
U.S. now ranks below all of Scandinavia, most of Europe, Uruguay, and the 
United Arab Emirates).363 The Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index 
for 2016 is one of the motivators for this thesis, and it notes that for the first time, 
the United States dropped below the required score of '8' to be considered a 'Full 
Democracy.'364  Since the index's inception in 2006, the U.S. has fallen from a 
high rating of 8.22 to 7.96.365 The most significant two drops were in 2011 and 
2016, though 2015 was near to the same magnitude (.07 drops for the former and 
.06 for 2015).366 The decrease in 2016 was accounted for by a decline in the 
'Functioning of Government' rating.367 This criterion is the source of the 
continuing deterioration of the U.S.'s rating.368 The report highlights hyper-
partisanship and the numerous problems associated with the current 
administration as the main factors causing this decline.  
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Public Confidence  
"Democracies do not end when they become "too democratic"; they begin 
to founder when they exclude the demos."370 'Demos' is the people of a nation; for 
the United States, they are also sovereign.371 Public confidence in the United 
States government has been on a decline since the 'end' of the Korean War.372 
 
369 The Economist Intelligence Unit. Democracy Index 2019: A Year of Democratic Setbacks and 
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After WWII, America and the 'West' saw nothing but global prosperity and 
eventual triumph of democracy and capitalism. While part of this dream came 
true, there were stumbles along the way that began to undermine faith in the 
system. The failure to 'win' in both Korea and Vietnam dealt blows American 
confidence. Watergate caused a dramatic fall in faith in the government. In the 
background, we have the continuing effect of gerrymandering undermining 
voters trust. After the Watergate drop, public opinion stayed at roughly the same 
level from the 1970s through to the early 1990s when it again dropped.373 The 
Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index does not track public confidence 
in individual nations per se, but it does follow support for democracy. The report 
for 2017 lists the following reasons for the decline 374 : 
• declining popular participation in elections and politics  
• weaknesses in the functioning of government  
• declining trust in institutions  
• dwindling appeal of mainstream representative parties  
• growing influence of unelected, unaccountable institutions 
and expert bodies  
• widening gap between political elites and electorates  
• decline in media freedoms  
• erosion of civil liberties, including curbs on free speech. 
 
The EIU's Democracy Index discusses these reasons and notes that the 
United States also shows all of these symptoms. It highlights the election of Mr. 
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Trump as a symptom of this dissatisfaction.375 The failure of the United States to 
address the reality of 'hegemony' and to properly handle sudden success has been 
at least part of the reason for the current situation.376 With all of this to provide 
back ground, a discussion of the concepts of social trust and how institutional 
corruption via gerrymandering represents a threat to democratic institutions is in 
order.   
Conclusion 
There is resistance to the idea that gerrymandering is institutional 
corruption. Those that resist the connection should reflect on what they think 
corruption is. Does gerrymandering meet the criteria? This thesis demonstrates it 
does and support ranges from the bench of the Supreme Court to research in 
political and social science. To assist this consideration, one scholar gives us 
“…the practice described undermines, or has a tendency to undermine, some 
legitimate institutional purpose or process…” and “However, the central meaning 
of the term “corruption” carries strong moral connotations…”377 The resistor 
must ask themselves, is it moral for gerrymanders to undermine the legitimacy of 
 
375 Ibid. 
376 There is much debate as to the reality of an American hegemony – or if there is such a thing, 
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377 Miller, Seumas. Institutional Corruption : A Study in Applied Philosophy. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139025249. See the introduction 
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align with the findings of Rothstein et al.  The findings of this resource point attention to those 
that are responsible for gerrymanders and their corrupt intent. 
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an election? In the American political system who is primary, the voter or party? 
This thesis finds that the voter is primary and thus gerrymandering is corrupt.  
Does social trust matter to democratic governance? Compiled above is a 
compelling collection of sources that show that it does matter. Indeed, it matters 
a great deal. The impacts of the level of social trust are far-reaching and hard to 
overstate.  
Cities, regions, and countries with more trusting people are 
likely to have bettering democratic institutions, economic 
growth, and less crime and the societal levels…378  
 
There is a direct correlation between social trust and trust in government. 
If one lacks the other suffers. As demonstrated in former totalitarian regimes, 
enforced 'trust,' if one can call it that, in the state damages interpersonal trust.379 
As with any correlation, a decline in one indicates a change in its correlate. A 
negative change in social trust indicates an adverse change in correlating 
prosocial phenomena. Social trust matters, not only to governance but really to 
all areas of social endeavor, nations often spend it without realizing it and 
competitors work to undermine it. The idea of growing social trust is one that 
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governments should take seriously. Institutional corruption, here 
gerrymandering, represents an ongoing threat to social trust in America. 
Additionally, protection and development of social trust should be treated 
and protected as much as any other national resource. For this issue, to put it 
succinctly: gerrymandering is corruption, corruption undermines social trust, 
decreasing social trust damages faith in democracy & undermines democratic 





This thesis assesses two factors, gerrymandering and corruption. It strives 
to bring attention to their relationship, as it has not been the subject of enough 
attention in the past. To do so, the thesis takes a fairness view of corruption. This 
serves to move the discussion from the purely criminal to a more general view on 
factors that can impact social cohesion. The thesis employs the American Political 
Development model to focus on durable changes in attitude in the nation, as 
reflected by the Court, toward malapportionment of electoral districts.  
Chapter one provided a firm understanding of gerrymandering and a 
discussion of corruption in American history. It demonstrated that gerrymanders 
are not a symptom of division but rather a source of it. The three eras, The Era of 
Silence, The Equal Rights Era, The Era of the Manageable Standard, allow the 
paper to focus on specific changes without becoming lost in other data. By 
discussing in detail, the litigation surrounding the issue, the chapter also 
demonstrates that gerrymandering was identified as highly objectionable 
throughout American history. It was tolerated so long as it was not perceived as a 
persistent threat. The view was that though a gerrymander might be successful in 
the short term, in the long, it could not be. In the first era, the consideration of 
Marbury, outside the more common examination of Judicial Review, also serves 
to bring the reader's attention to a narrower focus. The move to the Equal Rights 
Era reveals another aspect of the change in American society that grew from that 
pivotal period. Understanding that districting could be used to disenfranchise 
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minority voters and that that was as unacceptable as other forms of voter 
suppression was essential to later developments that applied more generally. The 
final era sees the Court wringing its hands over a mess it has created concerning 
partisan gerrymanders. It compounded the error by failing to recognize the threat 
created by combining the effects of the LULAC and Rucho decisions. 
Chapter two provided a solid understanding of the doctrinal source of the 
current controversy in districting. It followed the same litigation focus as the 
previous chapter. However, it abandoned the era focus and instead turned to 
conceptual evolution, starting with the foundation of the current controversy in 
the Justinian Code circa 530 B.C. From Rome, it fast-forwarded to another 
empire, England, and documentation of the Doubtful Question Doctrine via 
Blackstone. Marshall provides the next step by introducing the American version 
of judicial review and the political question doctrine. In 1962 Brennan delivered 
the next evolution via Baker v. Carr and the six criteria needed for the Court to 
use the political question doctrine to withhold judgment in a case. Chapter two 
also demonstrated that the Court is not perfect and is more than willing to correct 
errors of the past when needed—illustrated by the tragically flawed decision in 
Luther. It concluded with admissions from the majority in Rucho that 
gerrymandering is a perversion of the Constitution. The majority seems bound by 
an irrational attachment to the political question doctrine and fails to consider 
the entire list of criteria provided in Baker. Though the minority in Rucho might 
be safely accused of hyperbole, their basic assertion that the majority is ignoring 
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a manageable standard is accurate. The intent of the maps chosen was to create 
the most extreme partisan gerrymander they could. Thus, intent is an entirely 
reasonable and manageable standard. It is used in many cases across the breadth 
of judicial activity on a daily basis. 
Chapter three linked the previous chapters together with a thorough 
discussion of corruption and social trust and their relationship to 
gerrymandering. Corruption, as considered here, can be both illegal and legal via 
institutionalized methods of electoral distortion. It started this discussion by 
focusing on free and equal elections and how concern for them was evident in the 
colonies before the Constitution was drafted. Consideration of the profound 
revulsion of official corruption is illustrated both at the birth of the nation and in 
recent studies. Additionally, it considered changes in perceptions of corruption 
levels and the strength of democracy in the United States via the Transparency 
International Corruption Perception Index & the Economist Intelligence Unit's 
Democracy Index. Chapter three provided evidence of the corrosive effects of 
corruption on social trust. It demonstrated the importance of social trust to 
democratic institutions. Finally, chapter three delved into the concept of political 
trust, a close cousin of social trust. The individualized definition provided 
brought the importance of political trust into sharp focus. This definition can be 
expanded to include social trust. Doing so encourages consideration of these 
types of trust as resources to be stockpiled or depleted. Their depletion feeds the 
destruction of democratic institutions. On top of the previous chapters' 
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indictment of the current legal situation, section three provided yet more 
evidence that not only is the electoral system being undermined by 
gerrymandering but that this also undermines the foundations of our nation.  
Limits of the Analysis –  
One of the significant limitations of this study is the lack of empirical rigor. 
As was mentioned at the outset and will be mentioned in the areas for further 
research, a reliable measure for corruption, regardless of the definition, has thus 
far eluded researchers. Additionally, there are limitations to the reliability of 
perception-based data.  
Areas for Further Research  
Corruption Studies   
Measuring corruption empirically, statistically, is a hard problem. Due to 
the very nature of corruption, those who practice it are not willing to discuss it. 
Identifying and quantifying corrupt practices (i.e., legal corruption) versus illegal 
acts is especially challenging. For example, many would look at legislative 
earmarks as an indication of corruption, yet some of those earmarks serve many 
legitimate and vital functions. In another case, examinations of international 
finance rules and anti-corruption measures could easily make the examiner 
question the veritable "Swiss cheese" of regulations in the United States. It must 
be understood that all types of corruption are damaging to social trust, even if 




In the realm of elections, many have questioned the value of genuinely 
competitive elections, are they better than those where voters feel their voices 
were expressed successfully? Is more competition desirable? How often and to 
what extent are our laws perverted to corrupt ends? To what extent have 
apportionment or districting laws been used in this way? Do districts drawn with 
partisanship as the first consideration create better representation? How did the 
change in democratic views of equality occur? A search for empirical connections 
could also be of value. Finding valid measures of corruption though presents a 
hard problem. There are other areas of elections that serve to undermine 
social/political trust: voter suppression, election interference (both foreign and 
internal), & the impact of the various forms of media. All of these are currently 
being examined by academia and represent, to use another military term, 'target-
rich environments.' Additionally, studies of the recent development of grassroots 
policy organizations via the various internet platforms, their impact on political 
concerns at all levels of government is an area many have started to examine and 
still provides a host of research opportunities. Finally, assessing the impact of 
gerrymandering at the state level would be a fruitful pursuit. The House of 
Representatives has seen several changes in party control in recent years. Still, 




Social & Political Trust 
These areas are similar to corruption, and Longitudinal studies would add 
to our understanding of how social and political trust develop.380 Additional 
research to find empirical measures in both social and political, similar to 
Tomankova's work, arenas would help to add a more concrete dimension to the 
normative discussion. Citrin & Stoker highlight research into the effects of 
political trust, and adding to this type of study could increase interest in the 
subject from politicians and the public. The previously mentioned self-organizing 
election oriented and policy-focused groups that are pushing for reform in many 
areas could be encouraged by such research and thereby increase public 
involvement and decrease apathy.  
Conclusion 
 This thesis has two conclusions, one directly related to its initial question 
and one that arose out of the analysis. The intent at that start and the plan for 
this study was to focus on connections between gerrymandering and damage to 
democratic institutions, however, in the course of the analysis the critical role of 
the Court became clear. In this analysis when the initial goal achieved, with the 
relationship between corruption and gerrymandering explored, and how  
gerrymandering represents a continuing threat to our polity was established a 
second conclusion was discovered. The results of this development will play 
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themselves out in the coming wave of redistricting after the 2020 census because 
this conclusion is that the Court has given redistricting bodies the ability to stack 
the deck and choose the outcome of elections. Further, it has done so and seems 
to believe that it cannot do anything to correct its course. These two conclusions 
deserve some exploration, what are their implications, and how can the American 
polity eliminate the threat they represent? They are discussed in reverse order as 
the second conclusion, though relevant, is not the main focus of this paper. 
Separately, Lulac and Rucho are reasonable conclusions. Lulac followed 
the trend of allowing partisan gerrymanders due to a lack of a manageable 
standard. It departed from the usual in its finding that states can redistrict at will 
so long as they do so after each census. These two factors, when considered 
separately, are areas of concern for the polity. However, until Rucho, there was 
some perceived limitation on what a district could look like, what electoral result 
it could achieve. After Rucho, there are no limitations. For much of America's 
history, the Court has seen the use of gerrymandering as inconsequential. From a 
national and purely electoral view, this is entirely reasonable, and the prudential 
concern to respect the separation of powers was in the best tradition of the 
judiciary. Due to the changeable nature of voters and the mobility of the 
population, partisan based apportionment maps were ineffective in the long run 
and corrected themselves, as Justice O'Connor asserts in Bandemer. Three recent 
developments have rendered that laissez-faire approach moot: 1) the ability to 
redistrict at will, as a result of the 2006 decision in LULAC v. Perry, 2) the 
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elimination of any limit on the partisan nature of new electoral district maps & 3) 
computer-drawn electoral district maps. LULAC & Rucho, give the function of 
legislative redistricting a power beyond anything we have seen to date. Rucho 
effectively ties the hands of the Court or, at the very least, demonstrates the Court 
will not act to protect the polity from rigged elections. The bodies that draw 
electoral districts only need to do so in such a way that they achieve a majority. 
They can do so as often as they wish, according to Lulac, and according to Rucho, 
there is no limit on how they can draw districts to achieve this. When combined, 
these two powers create a stunning opportunity to short circuit the entire voting 
process. If only the maps were more reliable...  
Drawing effective partisan electoral maps were difficult and labor-
intensive. The process took weeks and did not produce reliable results. Drawing 
hundreds or thousands of maps that could fine-tune the results was out of the 
question. The maps that were the focus in the Rucho decision demonstrated that 
the computer results were reliable. Those maps, selected from thousands that the 
program produced in a minute fraction of the time required to produce a single 
map before computers. With the addition of computer software that can draw 
and measure districts, one might reasonably ask if there was any point in casting 
a vote? The corrupt, no matter what party, are now free to engineer elections and 
ensure their continued hegemony. The threat to the polity is apparent. It is well 
documented that Americans already demonstrate apathy regarding voting. 
Allowing engineered elections to continue will exacerbate this apathy. "For 
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corruption – it is as old as the polity itself it seems, the key is how well a society 
and its government can curb or control it."381 
Finally, the conclusion that is the focus of this paper. Gerrymandering is a 
threat to the democratic institutions the American polity holds dear. It has been a 
rot at the roots of the nation from the start. It is the result of reasonable people 
coming to different conclusions. However, they did so without perceiving the 
impact on the foundation of the nation, the people. The inescapable conclusion 
though, is that the voters must be in control; their voices must matter. 
Gerrymandering tells told them something different, though, because it is 
evidence that they are not in control of a key foundational piece of the electoral 
system, namely, who will represent who, that they do not matter. 
“Gerrymandering skews congressional districts and ultimately skews the entire 
electoral system.”382  
Earlier eras of the American experiment were more forgiving of mistakes, 
government was distant and rarely intruded on most people's lives. As 
communication speeds increased, the forgiveness of these mistakes decreased. 
Peoples frustrations grew, and as they felt ignored by their representatives, they 
became apathetic about their involvement. The Court awaits (is pushing for?) the 
work of Congress. Congress is the primary branch, according to the Constitution, 
 




in this controversy. In the oral arguments in Rucho, Justice Kavanaugh states, 
"And -- and there is a fair amount of activity going on in the states, recognizing 
the same problem that you're recognizing." Justice Gorsuch commented that 
several states had acted to rein in partisanship in redistricting. As of this writing, 
at the national level, H.B. 1 (116th Congress) awaits action from the Senate. It 
contains a host of election reform measures, including ones that address 
redistricting. If the Senate fails to act or if the President vetoes the bill, 
continuing to pressure the SCOTUS to step in will be vital. Members of Congress 
members have recognized that gerrymandering is a problem. The bipartisan 
group (primarily comprised of former members of Congress) referred to as the 
'Reformers  Caucus' is working to address gerrymandering and other issues 
affecting legislative efficacy.383    
There is also engagement at the state level. State courts are taking action, 
such as, in the Pennsylvania case mentioned in chapter three, where the Court 
redrew the districts. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court acted under the provisions 
of the state constitution. Thus, the SCOTUS refused to hear it. Additionally, the 
decision in Arizona Legislature v. Arizona Redistricting Commission (2015) is 
notable. The voters, via ballot referendum, took the redistricting power from the 
legislature and awarded it to a non-partisan redistricting commission selected by 
the electorate. Again this was supported by the SCOTUS. This decision showed 
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the Court held the people to be more accountable for this important task than the 
legislature. This deference to the state and the people is, perhaps, the only 
redeeming factor of the inaction by the SCOTUS. It shines a ray of light into this 
arena.  
Inaction by the SCOTUS seems to be signaling that while it does not feel it 
can take action to end gerrymandering, it will not interfere with the people doing 
so. This is a crucial window into their thinking if it is accurate. It indicates that 
the Court views the people as paramount. That “we the people” do retain some 
power in and are in charge of the nation. This message is one that the electorate 
needs to hear; they need to be reminded that they are in charge. A cursory foray 
onto the internet will reveal many state governments reacting to public pressure 
to address gerrymandering. The source of this pressure is, perhaps surprisingly, 
social discourse. Grassroots organizations, self-organized via various social media 
platforms, have started to exert pressure on state politicians.384 These 
organizations come from both partisan and non-partisan ideological roots. For 
example, 'RepresentUs' is a non-partisan (though rather openly left-leaning) 
interest group that supports several initiatives. They are focused on removing 
what they see as legal corruption. Specifically, this involves reducing the 
 
384All of these organizations are working on gerrymandering and other issues – Represent.us - 
https://represent.us, Reclaim the American Dream - http://reclaimtheamericandream.org, 
Common Cause - https://www.commoncause.org, & Indivisible - https://indivisible.org It should 
be noted that all of these organizations can be described as being on the ‘left’ despite most of them 
being self-described as ‘non-partisan’. The author was unable to find similar organizations on the 
conservative side of the political spectrum. 
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influence of money and lobbying, more importantly, from the perspective of this 
paper, and fixing 'broken' elections; gerrymandering falls under this heading.385  
'Reclaim the American Dream' focuses on a similar array of concerns adding in 
some economic concerns such as student debt and the minimum wage. 
Gerrymandering specifically and voter suppression generally are also listed in 
their top issues. Both 'Common Cause' and 'Indivisible' are concerned with 
gerrymandering but are more partisan than the previous two organizations.  
Gerrymandering falls in with a broader category of malign political 
activity, voter suppression. Understandably, the concerns about gerrymandering 
and voter suppression are more concentrated on the left of the spectrum as the 
last two Republican Presidents were elected as the result of contentious votes 
without winning the popular vote.  
There are other movements as well, recently a growing number of states 
(six as of this writing) have instituted non-partisan or balanced districting boards 
(e.g., Arizona.) Only one of these, California, has an independent commission 
made up of voters. Others have commissions selected by politicians or a 
combination of politicians and the State Courts. The California answer is the 
most voter inclusive as the selection of commission members is representative of 
the population and not tied to people serving in government. Commissions can 
 




employ the same computer programs used for ill intent elsewhere to achieve 
more balanced districts and achieve real competition in the marketplace of ideas. 
This move to redistricting commissions is, arguably, one of the better solutions to 
gerrymandering. That is, assuming voters wish to continue to use single-member 
districts elected in first past the post elections. There are other options.  
Another possible response would be to adopt one of the various forms of 
proportional representation. To some, this is an attractive idea to refocus state 
and national legislatures on constituents and policy. Proportional representation 
addresses the concerns of political minorities over losing their voices and cures 
us of gerrymandering by eliminating our current system of using districts for 
representative selection. It could also allow for the rise of smaller parties and 
erase the two-party structure that has been a fixture of American politics from its 
earliest days. Changing to a proportional representation system is a controversial 
solution and would require careful study and execution. Many of the smaller 
states are worried their voices will be lost among the majority from larger states, 
for example, California & Texas, if this type of system were adopted. 
The national judiciary and legislature have, thus far, failed to effectively 
address gerrymandering, the associated corrupting influence of it and the 
fundamental challenges to the electoral process that are eating away at the 
foundations of the Republic. Some state governments seem to understand that 
the contest of ideas must take place on a level playing field so that the voters can 
choose who will represent them. Even if other state governments do not 
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understand it, they do feel the heat from their constituents on this matter. The 
people and some statesmen are pushing congressional and state action on 
gerrymandering. This action, regardless of its motivation, can save the country 
from becoming nothing more than a paper democracy. Thus, at the close of this 
thesis, the author finds democracy the United States threatened, but has hope 










Name Effect on Districting Year 
Apportionment 
Act of 1842 
‘The Apportionment Act of 1842 increased the ratio 
of constituents to representatives & required that 
House members be elected in single-member 
districts. This change created the foundation for 
how we understand representation.’386 
1842 
Apportionment 
Act of 1911 
Set the number of Representatives at 433. 
Additionally, added language regarding district 
shape “…compactness, 
contiguity and equal population requirements of 
the Apportionment Act of 1911…”387 
1911 
Apportionment 
Act of 1929 
Set the number of Representatives at 435. Dropped 
compactness language.388 
1929 
Voting Rights Act 
of 1965 
Under the 1970 and 1975 Amendments - “In 1973, 
the Supreme Court held certain legislative multi-
member districts unconstitutional under the 14th 
Amendment on the ground that they systematically 
diluted the voting strength of minority citizens in 
Bexar County, Texas. This decision in White v. 
Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), strongly shaped 
litigation through the 1970s against at-large 
systems and gerrymandered redistricting plans. In 
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), however, the 
Supreme Court required that any constitutional 
claim of minority vote dilution must include proof 
of a racially discriminatory purpose, a requirement 
that was widely seen as making such claims far 
more difficult to prove.389 
1965 
 
386 Supra note 97. 
387 Earl M. Maltz, Power in Numbers: Reapportionment and the Constitution (Philadelphia, PA: 
,[2011]). 
388 Ibid. 
389 (Anonymous) "History of Federal Voting Rights Laws," last modified -08-06T09:30:07-04:00, 
accessed Jul 2, 2019, https://www.justice.gov/crt/history-federal-voting-rights-laws. 
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Selected Redistricting/Gerrymandering Litigation 
 
Table B 390 
 
Parties Effect Year 
Colgrove v Green “The Court held that the Illinois districts were constitutional, 
largely because existing laws imposed no requirements "as to 
the compactness, contiguity and equality in population of 
districts." In a plurality opinion, Frankfurter declined to 
involve the Court in the districting process, arguing that the 
political nature of apportionment precluded judicial 
intervention. "The remedy for unfairness in districting is to 
secure State legislatures that will apportion properly, or to 




“A state violates the Fifteenth Amendment when it constructs 
boundary lines between electoral districts for the purpose of 
denying equal representation to African Americans.”392 
1960 
Baker v Carr “In an opinion which explored the nature of "political 
questions" and the appropriateness of Court action in them, 
the Court held that there were no such questions to be 
answered in this case and that legislative apportionment was a 
justiciable issue. In his majority opinion, Justice Brennan 
provided past examples in which the Court had intervened to 
correct constitutional violations in matters pertaining to state 
administration and the officers through whom state affairs are 
conducted. Brennan concluded that the Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection issues which Baker and others 
raised in this case merited judicial evaluation.”393 
1962 
 
390 This table was compiled by searching cases found in the literature on the ‘Oyez’ website. A 
database of US Supreme Court cases. It is a collaboration among several institutions. Please check 
https://www.oyez.org/about for further information. 
391 "Colegrove v. Green." Oyez. Accessed July 1, 2019. https://www.oyez.org/cases/1940-
1955/328us549. 
392 "Gomillion v. Lightfoot." Oyez. Accessed July 1, 2019. https://www.oyez.org/cases/1960/32. 





“…the Court upheld the challenge to the Alabama system, 
holding that Equal Protection Clause demanded "no less than 
substantially equal state legislative representation for all 
citizens...." Noting that the right to direct representation was 
"a bedrock of our political system," the Court held that both 
houses of bicameral state legislatures had to be apportioned 
on a population basis. States were required to "honest and 
good faith" efforts to construct districts as nearly of equal 




“Held: 1. As in Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, which involved 
alleged malapportionment of seats in a state legislature, the 
District Court had jurisdiction of the subject matter; 
appellants had standing to sue, and they had stated a 
justiciable cause of action on which relief could be granted. 
Pp. 376 U. S. 5-6. 
2. A complaint alleging debasement of the right to vote as a 
result of a state congressional apportionment law is not 
subject to 
Page 376 U. S. 2 
dismissal for "want of equity" as raising a wholly "political" 
question. Pp. 376 U. S. 6-7. 
3. The constitutional requirement in Art. I, § 2, that 
Representatives be chosen "by the People of the several 
States" means that, as nearly as is practicable, one person's 
vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as 
another's. Pp. 376 U. S. 7-8, 376 U. S. 18. 206 F.Supp. 276, 




“The Court today upholds statewide legislative apportionment 
plans for Connecticut and Texas, even though these plans 
admittedly entail substantial inequalities in the population of 
the representative districts, and even though the States have 
made virtually no attempt to justify their failure 'to construct 
districts . . . as nearly of equal population as is practicable.'”396 
1973 
 
394 "Reynolds v. Sims." Oyez. Accessed July 1, 2019. https://www.oyez.org/cases/1963/23. 
395 "Wesberry v. Sanders." Oyez. Accessed July 1, 2019. https://www.oyez.org/cases/1963/22. 






 “The Court upheld the Wyoming apportionment scheme and 
found no Fourteenth Amendment violations. Justice Powell 
argued that using counties as legislative districts and assuring 
at least one representative per county supported 
"substantial and legitimate state concerns." 
(emphasis added) Since the population variations in the 
Wyoming plan were the result of the consistent application of 
a nondiscriminatory and legitimate state policy, the plan was 
consistent with the Constitution. Any dilution of voting 
strength which the constituents of the other sixty-three 
representatives may have experienced as a result of Niobrara's 
relatively small population was minimal and irrelevant given 




“Congressional districts must be mathematically equal in 
population, unless necessary to achieve a legitimate state 
objective.”398 “Even though the population differences in the 
districts were slight, the Court held that they were 
unconstitutional because they "were not the result of a good-
faith effort to achieve population equality." Justice Brennan 
upheld past Court decisions (Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 1973, and 
Wesberry v. Sanders, 1964) and argued that relying on a strict 
numerical standard of populations to assess district equality 




“The Court held that while the apportionment law may have 
had a discriminatory effect on the Democrats, that effect was 
not "sufficiently adverse" to violate the Equal Protection 
Clause. The mere lack of proportional representation did not 
unconstitutionally diminish the Democrats' electoral power. 
The Court also ruled that political gerrymandering 
claims were properly justiciable under the Equal 
Protection Clause, noting that judicially manageable 




397 "Brown v. Thomson." Oyez. Accessed July 1, 2019. https://www.oyez.org/cases/1982/82-65. 
398 (Anonymous). Accessed July 11, 2019.  
http://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/redistricting-and-the-supreme-court-the-most-
significant-cases.aspx.  
399 "Karcher v. Daggett." Oyez. Accessed July 11, 2019. https://www.oyez.org/cases/1982/81-
2057. 






The Court found that five of the six contested districts 
discriminated against blacks by diluting the power of their 
collective vote. Justice William J. Brennan Jr. delivered the 
opinion for a unanimous court. The District Court properly 
performed its function "to ascertain whether minority group 
members constitute a politically cohesive unit and to 
determine whether whites vote sufficiently as a bloc usually to 
defeat the minority's preferred candidate." The District Court 
correctly analyzed data from three election cycles in North 
Carolina to determine that the black voters strongly supported 
black candidates, whereas whites usually voted against black 
candidates. The redistricting plan apportioned "politically 
cohesive groups of black voters" into districts where blocs of 
white voters would consistently defeat the black candidates. 
In violation of the Voting Rights Act, this damaged the ability 
of black citizens "to participate equally in the political process 
and to elect candidates of their choice."401 Established a tool 
for measuring if an apportionment plan violated the Voting 
Rights Act. 
1986 
Shaw v Reno “The Court held that although North Carolina's 
reapportionment plan was racially neutral on its face, the 
resulting district shape was bizarre enough to suggest that it 
constituted an effort to separate voters into different districts 
based on race. The unusual district, while perhaps created by 
noble intentions, seemed to exceed what was reasonably 
necessary to avoid racial imbalances. After concluding that the 
residents' claim did give rise to an equal protection challenge, 
the Court remanded - adding that in the absence of 
contradictory evidence, the District Court would have to 
decide whether or not some compelling governmental interest 
justified North Carolina's plan.”402 
1993 
Miller v. Johnson “Yes. In some instances, a reapportionment plan may be so 
highly irregular and bizarre in shape that it rationally cannot 
be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate 
voters based on race. Applying the rule laid down in Shaw v. 
Reno requires strict scrutiny whenever race is the "overriding, 
predominant force" in the redistricting process.” 
1995 
 
401 "Thornburg v. Gingles." Oyez. Accessed July 11, 2019. https://www.oyez.org/cases/1985/83-
1968. 
402 "Shaw v. Reno." Oyez. Accessed July 2, 2019. https://www.oyez.org/cases/1992/92-357. 
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Vieth v Jubelier “In a split decision that had no majority opinion, the Court 
decided not to intervene in this case because no appropriate 
judicial solution could be found. Justice Antonin Scalia, for a 
four-member plurality, wrote that the Court should declare all 
claims related to political (but not racial) gerrymandering 
non-justiciable, meaning that courts could not hear them. 
Because no court had been able to find an appropriate remedy 
to political gerrymandering claims in the 18 years since the 
Court decided Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, which had 
held that such a remedy had not been found yet but might 
exist, Scalia wrote that it was time to recognize that the 
solution simply did not exist. 
 
Justice Anthony Kennedy, however, wrote in his concurring 
opinion (which provided the deciding fifth vote for the 
judgment) that the Court should rule narrowly in this case 
that no appropriate judicial solution could be found, but not 
give up on finding one eventually.”403 
2004 
LULAC v Perry “The Supreme Court held that the Texas Legislature's 
redistricting plan did not violate the Constitution, but that 
part of the plan violated the Voting Rights Act. Justice 
Anthony Kennedy, writing for a majority of the justices, stated 
that District 23 had been redrawn in such a way as to deny 
Latino voters as a group the opportunity to elect a candidate 
of their choosing, thereby violating the Voting Rights Act. 
Justice Kennedy also wrote, however, that nothing in the 
Constitution prevented the state from redrawing its electoral 
boundaries as many times as it wanted, so long as it did so at 




“The Court, in a per curiam opinion (unanimous decision), 
reversed the district court's decision. The Court held that the 
lower court failed to defer to West Virginia's reasonable 
exercise of political judgment. Even though the state could 
have chosen a re-districting plan with less of a population 
disparity, none of the other plans satisfied the state's 
legitimate objectives. Therefore, the minor disparity in 
2012 
 
403 "Vieth v. Jubelirer." Oyez. Accessed July 2, 2019. https://www.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-1580. 




population was justified to achieve those objectives.”405 





“The Court held that the district court improperly considered 
evidence of statewide racial effects as a claim that the state 
used race as a factor when redrawing all of the boundary lines, 
when the actual allegations were that the racial 
gerrymandering took place in a few select electoral districts. 
Next, the Court held that the evidence suggested that the 
Caucus had standing to sue because it appeared to have 
members in every electoral district in the State of Alabama; 
the Court directed the Caucus to provide membership 
information sufficient to support this inference on remand. 
The district court also erred by considering Alabama’s goal of 
obtaining a 1% population deviation among districts as a 
relevant factor to determine whether race was a 
“predominate” factor in redrawing the electoral districts 
rather than considering the traditional goals of the Voting 
Rights Act. Finally, the Court rejected the district court’s 
holding that Alabama’s gerrymandering satisfied strict 
scrutiny. In application, Alabama’s interest in maintaining a 
particular population percentage of minority voters in each 
district did not equate to the Voting Rights Act’s goal of 
preventing “retrogression in respect to racial minorities’ 
‘ability . . . to elect their preferred candidates of choice’; 
therefore, using a race as a factor to meet Alabama’s 
extraneous goals was not justified. The Court vacated and 
remanded the district court’s decision for further 







“Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the 5-
4 majority. The Court held that the Elections Clause of the 
federal Constitution did not preclude an independent 
commission, created by initiative, from creating the map for 
congressional districts. Although the Elections Clause 
specifically mentions the state legislature, at the time the 
federal Constitution was ratified, direct lawmaking by the 
people did not occur. Since then, state Constitutions have 
2015 
 
405 "Tennant v. Jefferson County Commission." Oyez. Accessed July 2, 2019. 
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-1184. 




been ratified that specifically place lawmaking power in the 
hands of the electorate in the form of an initiative, as the 
Arizona State Constitution did. Judicial precedent establishes 
that redistricting is a legislative function that must be 
performed in accordance with the state Constitution’s 
structure of lawmaking; because the Arizona state 
Constitution allows lawmaking to occur by a referendum of 
the electorate, Proposition 106 was an acceptable use of that 
power. Additionally, because the use of such an initiative 
would not be questioned if it were employed to redistrict for 
local and state elections, it should also be allowed for federal 
elections.”407 
Evenwel v Abbot “The “one person, one vote” principle of the Equal Protection 
Clause allows a state to design its legislative districts based on 
total population. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the 
unanimous decision and the opinion for the six-justice 
majority. The Court held that constitutional history, judicial 
precedent, and consistent state practice all demonstrate that 
apportioning legislative districts based on total population is 
permissible under the Equal Protection Clause. Based on the 
wording of the Fourteenth Amendment and the legislative 
debates surrounding its adoption, the legislature at the time 
clearly intended for representation to be apportioned in the 
House based on total population, and it would be illogical to 
prohibit the states from doing the same within their own 
legislatures. In cases in which the Court has evaluated 
whether districting maps violate the Equal Protection Clause, 
the Court has consistently looked at total population figures to 
determine whether the maps impermissibly deviate from 
perfect population equality. Additionally, the total population 
approach has been used by all states and many local 
jurisdictions, and there is no reason to upset this accepted 
practice.”408 
2016 
Cooper v. Harris “The district court did not error in determining that North 
Carolina’s new districting plan constituted an 
unconstitutional racial gerrymander, and neither claim 
nor issue preclusion based on the state court case dictate the 
2017 
 
407 "Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission." Oyez. Accessed 
July 2, 2019. https://www.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-1314. 
408 "Evenwel v. Abbott." Oyez. Accessed July 2, 2019. https://www.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-940. 
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outcome of this case. (emphasis added) Justice Elena Kagan 
delivered the opinion for the 5-3 majority. The Court held that 
the district court was presented with sufficient evidence to 
find that race was the predominant rationale for the 
redistricting. Additionally, North Carolina did not meet its 
burden of proving that it had a compelling interest to sort 
voters based on race that it met with narrowly tailored means. 
Although complying with the Voting Rights Act (VRA) might 
serve as a compelling reason, the state must demonstrate that 
it had good cause to think that it would transgress the 
requirements of the VRA if it did not draw race-based district 
boundaries. Because there was no evidence of “white bloc 
voting” prior to the new districting plan, there was no 
sufficient reason for the state to think there was a potential 
VRA violation that required race-based districting. The Court 
also held that, although issue or claim preclusion may arise 
when plaintiffs in two cases have a special relationship, the 
state never proved that such a relationship existed between 
the plaintiffs in this case and those in the similar state court 
case.”409 
Gil v Whitford Rejected for consideration based on lack of standing. “The 
plaintiffs failed to demonstrate Article III standing, so there is 
no need to resolve any of the questions presented. In a 
unanimous decision authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, 
the Court sidestepped (for now) all of the key issues regarding 
partisan gerrymandering, resolving the case instead on the 
technical issue of judicial standing. For a plaintiff to bring a 
case in federal court, she must have Article III standing, which 
requires showing three elements, one of which is "injury in 
fact." To show injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that she has 
suffered "invasion of a legally protected interest" that is 
"concrete and particularized." In this case, the Court found 
that the plaintiffs alleged but did not prove individual harms, 
providing evidence instead only of statewide harms of alleged 
partisan gerrymandering. The Court thus vacated the 




409 "Cooper v. Harris." Oyez. Accessed July 11, 2019. https://www.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-1262. 





(See Rucho below) “Without resolving the substantive 
questions, the Court held, in an unsigned per curiam opinion 
(unanimous decision), that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying the Republican voters' motion for a 
preliminary injunction. To succeed on a motion for 
preliminary injunction, the party seeking the injunction must 
show likelihood of success on the merits, that he is likely to 
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, 
that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an 
injunction is in the public's interest. Even assuming, contrary 
to the district court's findings, that the plaintiffs were likely to 
succeed on the merits, the Court found that they had 
unreasonably delayed seeking a preliminary injunction and 
that the public interest was not served in granting the 
injunction. Thus, it was not an abuse of discretion for the 




Common Cause &  
Lamone v. 
Benisek 
“Partisan gerrymandering claims are not justiciable because 
they present a political question beyond the reach of the 
federal courts. 
 
Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the 5-4 majority opinion. 
Federal courts are charged with resolving cases and 
controversies of a judicial nature. In contrast, questions of a 
political nature are “nonjusticiable,” and the courts cannot 
resolve such questions. Partisan gerrymandering has existed 
since prior to the independence of the United States, and, 
aware of this occurrence, the Framers chose to empower state 
legislatures, “expressly checked and balanced by the Federal 
Congress” to handle these matters. While federal courts can 
resolve “a variety of questions surrounding districting,” 
including racial gerrymandering, it is beyond their power to 
decide the central question: when has political 
gerrymandering gone too far. In the absence of any “limited 
and precise standard” for evaluating partisan gerrymandering, 




411 "Benisek v. Lamone." Oyez. Accessed July 2, 2019. https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-333. 
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Justice Elena Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia 
Sotomayor joined. Justice Kagan criticized the Court for 
sidestepping a critical question involving the violation of “the 
most fundamental of . . . constitutional rights: the rights to 
participate equally in the political process, to join with others 
to advance political beliefs, and to choose their political 
representatives.” Justice Kagan argued that by not intervening 
in the political gerrymanders, the Court effectively 
“encourage[s] a politics of polarization and dysfunction” that 
“may irreparably damage our system of government.” She 
argued that the standards adopted in lower courts across the 
country do meet the contours of the “limited and precise 
standard” the majority demanded yet purported not to find. 
 
This case was consolidated with Lamone v. Benisek, No. 18-









A note on Empirical Examinations: 
At the start of this journey, the intent was to discover any empirical 
connection between corruption and gerrymandering. As the search continued, 
issues with data became apparent. Corruption is hard to measure accurately due 
to its very nature. Many researchers have chosen to use the number of 
convictions for corruption as a measure, primarily since that data is easily 
gathered.413 This may present us with a case of ‘an available hammer’ and not a 
valid measure.414 Below are two graphs of data used by Dr. Winter that he has 
graciously made available for this examination. 415  Neither of them shows 
patterns near times of redistricting. The first is a graph of those states that had 
the most convictions(A). The second graph is of states that are known to have 
districts that fail standards for compactness(B), itself a controversial measure of 
gerrymandering. Graph B shows a decrease in convictions for all states near the 
2000 census and thus does not present a strong case for a relationship. Other 
combinations and groupings were tested and, once again, no patterns emerged.  
 
413 Winters, Richard F. and Amanda E. Maxwell. 2004. "A Quarter-Century of (Data on) 
Corruption in the American States." Conference Papers -- Midwestern Political Science 
Association: 1. doi: mpsa_proceeding_24374.pdf. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=asn&AN=16055277&site=ehost-
live&scope=site.  
414 Supra note 48 
















Below is the code used in R to generate the graphs above: 
 
A.  
plot(xdata, ptsNY, xaxt="n", type="o", col="blue", 
pch="*", xlim = c(0,35), ylim=c(0,200), xlab = "Year", ylab 
= "Convictions", main = "Examples Chosen by Number of 
Convictions") 
axis(1, at=0:36, labels=1975:2011) 
points(xdata, ptsCal, col="darkred", pch="*") 
lines(xdata, ptsCal, col="darkred") 
ptsIll=CWintersxp$Illinois 
points(xdata, ptsIll, col="Green", pch="*") 
lines(xdata, ptsIll, col="Green") 
ptsFL=CWintersxp$Florida 
points(xdata, ptsFL, col="red", pch="*") 
lines(xdata, ptsFL, col="red") 
ptsPenn=CWintersxp$Pennsylvania 
points(xdata, ptsPenn, col="darkgreen", pch="*") 
lines(xdata, ptsPenn, col="darkgreen") 
points(xdata, ptsVmt, col="orange", pch="*") 
lines(xdata, ptsVmt, col="orange") 
points(xdata, ptsWyo, col="black", pch="*") 







plot(xdata, ptsMlnd, xaxt="n", type="o", col="blue", 
pch="*", xlim = c(0,35), ylim=c(0,100), xlab = "Year", ylab 
= "Convictions", main = "Examples Chosen by Electoral 
District Compactness") 
points(xdata, ptsNV, col="green", pch="*") 
lines(xdata, ptsNV, col="green") 
points(xdata, ptsInd, col="orange", pch="*") 
lines(xdata, ptsInd, col="orange") 
points(xdata, ptsHaw, col="darkgreen", pch="*") 
lines(xdata, ptsHaw, col="darkgreen") 
points(xdata, ptsLou, col="purple", pch="*") 
lines(xdata, ptsLou, col="purple") 
points(xdata, ptsNC, col="red", pch="*") 
lines(xdata, ptsNC, col="red") 
points(xdata, ptsWV, col="black", pch="*") 
lines(xdata, ptsWV, col="black") 
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